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Summary of main points 
 
In order to understand how British defence policy has progressed since 1997 it is useful to 
examine some of the broader parameters that have shaped both the defence debate and the 
conduct of contemporary warfare more generally.  
 
The central focus of defence policy is on the Armed Forces and the broad issues 
surrounding their use, size, structure, organisation, capabilities, and management. However, 
defence policy overlaps with other areas of Government, and in recent years such overlaps 
have been particularly pronounced as the distinction between domestic and foreign threats 
have become increasingly blurred, primarily with the increased threat from international 
terrorism.  
 
At the heart of defence policy is the perennial and universal problem of matching 
commitments with resources, or bringing political ambitions and resources into balance.  
This is often described as being an iterative process or a constant dialogue between these 
two competing considerations. In simple terms, planned commitments, whether in terms of 
homeland defence or contingent operations overseas, shape decisions on military 
resources; but equally, available resources determine the level and type of possible 
commitments to be undertaken.  
 
However, defence policy is also inherently complex in that it is a process of planning for the 
unknown. Often no precise threat can be accurately predicted and intricately prepared for, 
planners must make their decisions on the basis of imperfect ‘likely’ scenarios that may be 
rendered irrelevant by subsequent events.  This uncertainty in threat assessment and 
planning has implications for the resources debate. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War several dynamics have emerged which have altered the 
fundamental approach of the West to contemporary warfare. The most far reaching of those 
has been the ‘revolution in military affairs’ which has introduced large-scale technological 
advancement, thereby changing the very nature of warfare. The prevailing tendency toward 
Coalition warfare and the move towards ‘joint operations’ has also led to a re-assessment of 
the types of capabilities and force structure required to conduct contingent operations. Other 
dimensions which have also shaped the direction of defence policy have been the impact of 
privatisation; the increasing role of the media within the battlespace; changes in the public 
consciousness towards warfare and the Armed Forces more specifically, and the changing 
nature of the civil-military relationship.  
 
All of these dynamics have been evident in the conduct of British defence policy over the last 
ten years.  
 
This paper should be read as background to Library Research Paper, RP08/57, British 
defence policy since 1997.  
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I Background to Defence Policy 
In order to understand how British defence policy has progressed since 1997 it is useful 
to examine some of the broader parameters that have shaped both the defence debate 
and the conduct of contemporary warfare more generally.  
 
 
A. Theoretical Context 
1. Politics and Defence 
The central focus of defence policy is on the Armed Forces and the broad issues 
surrounding their use, size, structure, organisation, capabilities, and management. 
However, defence policy overlaps with other areas of government, and in recent years 
such overlaps have been particularly pronounced as the distinction between domestic 
and foreign threats have become increasingly blurred, primarily with the increased threat 
from international terrorism.  
 
Indeed the roles and priorities accorded to the military are a natural consequence of a 
government’s foreign policies and to an extent its domestic home affairs and security 
agenda. As Clausewitz argued almost two centuries ago, “war is simply a continuation of 
political intercourse, with the addition of other means”.1 All defence decisions, whether in 
regard to alliances, troop numbers, equipment or force structure, are subsequently a 
direct result of broader strategic-political objectives.  
 
Defence should therefore be regarded an important aspect of the government’s broader 
security toolkit, which, along with armed force, incorporates political, diplomatic, 
economic and law enforcement instruments.  Security may be best provided through any 
one of these or various combinations of them.  Also, as a number of commentators have 
made clear, the military is increasingly asked to deal with situations which it alone cannot 
solve, but which instead depend upon the concerted integration of political, economic 
and social policies.2 
 
Of course, even the most perfectly formulated defence policy can never entirely 
guarantee success. Military outcomes are dependent on a number of other factors, both 
political and military, that pervade the battlespace. Nevertheless, excellence in defence 
policy can certainly significantly reduce the potential for failure and greatly enhance the 
chances of success.  Colin Gray explains what he refers to as the ‘economic and 
logistical dimension’ of strategy: 
 
has a subordinate but enabling role vis-à-vis the political and operational 
dimensions.  Generals, no matter how gifted as operational commanders, are 
constrained by the resources – human and material – available to them and their 
foe at the operational level of war.  Almost every campaign and war is shaped in 
 
 
 
1  Carl von Clausewitz, On War translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard, 1993, p.731 
2  For example see Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force. This was also reflected in the Government’s national 
Security Strategy which was published in March 2008. 
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its course and at least influenced in its outcome by the economic-logistical 
dimension.3 
 
There is, of course, a matter of degree here as defence can never be the only 
consideration of government. It is one area of policy that must find its place, in both 
political and financial terms, among the other priorities that any functioning state hopes 
to deliver for its citizens. Except in overtly militaristic societies, or in times of existential 
crisis, defence concerns will rarely overshadow all else. Thus defence policy is a difficult 
matter of balancing the need for sufficient provision of security with the other myriad 
functions of government. Nevertheless, many would argue adequate defence and 
security is a fundamental precondition for the other objectives the state wishes to pursue. 
As Gwyn Prins and Robert Salisbury observed in a February 2008 article for the RUSI 
Journal: 
 
Security is not only a question for Chiefs of the Defence staff. It matters to every 
citizen of the United Kingdom. Security is the primary function of the state, for 
without it there can be no state, and no rule of law.4 
 
2. The Commitment v. Resources Equation   
At the heart of defence policy is the perennial and universal problem of matching 
commitments with resources or, stated differently, about bringing political ambitions and 
resources into balance.  This is often described as being an iterative process or a 
constant dialogue between these two competing considerations. In simple terms, 
planned commitments, whether in terms of homeland defence or contingent operations 
overseas, shape decisions on military resources; but equally available resources 
determine the level and type of possible commitments that can be undertaken.  
 
At a more detailed level, commitments relate primarily to the ends of government, 
including the demands of foreign policy and its political objectives, broader security 
concerns, threat assessment, planning assumptions, and the expected number, 
concurrency and intensity of operations. This area thus covers the issues surrounding 
the planned uses of the Armed Forces: why they are deemed necessary and what 
contingencies they will be required to deal with. The issue of resources is potentially 
more complex as the concept is not just concerned with amounts of available money, 
materiel or platforms, but also the nature of those resources, how they are distributed, 
structured, organised, and commanded. This side of the defence equation, concerned 
primarily with available means, involves such issues as procuring the necessary 
equipment, structuring and organising forces appropriately, developing robust doctrine, 
and providing the relevant training and conditions for military personnel. Of course, the 
amount of available resources is also heavily influenced by the constraints on central 
government spending, and pressures within government to generate efficiency savings.   
 
 
 
 
3  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.32 
4  “Risk, threat and security”, RUSI Journal, February 2008 
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3. Contingency in Defence Planning 
Defence policy is inherently complex in that it is a process of planning for the unknown. 
Because often no precise threat can be accurately predicted and intricately prepared for, 
planners must make their decisions on the basis of imperfect ‘likely’ scenarios that may 
be rendered irrelevant by subsequent events.5 
 
As Lawrence Freedman explains: 
 
Military planners must consider potential enemies from fanatical terrorists to 
disaffected great powers.  They must prepare for hostile acts, which can cover 
the spectrum from the improvised explosive device in a shopping mall to guerrilla 
ambushes to traditional battle to nuclear exchanges, and perhaps even 
‘cyberwar’ directed against critical information systems.6  
 
He also notes that in order to deal with such eventualities, “Governments require a set of 
capabilities that can provide the flexibility and versatility to cope with this wide range of 
contingencies”7 This uncertainty in threat assessment and planning also has implications 
for the resources debate. Steven Haines explains this dilemma:   
 
It is a truism that the basis for long term defence planning is a potentially unsound 
assessment of the nature of future security, the threats to it and what will be 
required in the way of equipment and trained personnel to combat those threats. 
There can be no certainty in this respect. History has demonstrated that if 
decisions are correct, it is probably down to a good dose of luck supported by 
what can at best be described as good judgement.  
 
It is also a truism that, given the cost of the future defence programme, those 
charged with providing the substantial investment necessary to support it require 
a convincing argument that such investment is necessary. Treasury officials and 
the political leaders for whom they work need convincing arguments that the 
levels of investment required are fully justified relative to the other demands on 
the Exchequer. These two truisms present a fundamental dilemma. The 
Government needs to be reasonably confident that its investment will be sound 
and yet it has no way of knowing at the point of decision whether it is or not.8  
 
Defence policy shares with military strategy this element of what Clausewitz referred to 
as ‘friction, chance and uncertainty’. As Gray notes, “Chance does not quite rule but is 
always a player, and friction can impede cumulatively the smooth performance of 
anything and everything”.9   
 
The uncertainty associated with defence policy, as with war, is also a function of the 
interplay of countless intangibles such as troop morale and foreign and domestic public 
and political opinion. Defence policy is often viewed as being an area concerned with 
distinctly material matters such as equipment orders or the organisation and structure of 
 
 
 
5  For example, military planners on the whole did not foresee the events of 9/11. 
6  Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, p.76 
7  Ibid, p.77 
8  Steven Haines, “The real strategic environment”, RUSI Journal, October 2007 
9  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.41 
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the Services. Yet a critical consideration is the potential impact that decisions on these 
and other issues may have on the more psychological aspects of defence, which are 
themselves important preconditions for military effectiveness. Low troop morale can 
seriously undermine operational effectiveness, poor public perceptions of the Armed 
Forces can harm recruitment and retention rates, and critical international opinion can 
prompt unwanted changes in the policies of allies.   
 
Defence policy is further complicated by the fact that there is often a notable time-lag in 
many areas. For example, those responsible for taking decisions on the operational 
deployment of forces may be significantly constrained by decisions taken many years 
previously on the procurement of equipment, the size of the Armed Forces and requisite 
force structure.10 This is because once decisions on defence are taken, it is often much 
later (for a variety of reasons, such as lengthy procurement processes or bureaucratic 
inertia) before the actual outcome of those changes are realised. Often in that time 
period threats or scenarios on which those original decisions were based can either 
disappear or change beyond all recognition.11 
 
4. Defence Policy and Military Strategy   
There is a subtle yet important distinction, touched upon above, which exists between 
defence policy and military strategy.  Defence policy does not automatically involve 
analysis of, or direct decisions regarding, the conduct of individual operations; that is, 
respectively, the realm of critical military analysis or military strategy. However, 
successful military strategy is heavily dependent on an effective defence policy, as 
soldiers must be recruited, clothed, fed, trained, led and equipped to a standard that is 
high enough for them to engage effectively in combat with the enemy or undertake any 
other tasks asked of them.   
 
Actual military success is dependent on far more than defence policy alone can hope to 
cover, but that policy will always be a crucial basic determinant of success. In a similar 
vein, Colin Gray has noted, “Wars are not won directly by logisticians, but poor 
logisticians make it all but impossible even for operational military genius to exercise its 
talent effectively” while superior organisation also cannot “offset monumental operational 
incompetence or inadequate training of troops”.12 
 
From this perspective, defence policy is ultimately one crucial aspect of strategy: the 
notoriously difficult task of linking policy objectives with the military means available. 
Defence policy cannot do everything, but it can go a long way in providing the Armed 
Forces with the best possible chance of achieving its objectives: 
 
Just as strategy is ‘done’ by tactical activity, also it is, or should be, ‘done’ by a 
bureaucratic organisation that staffs alternatives critically, coordinates rival inputs, 
 
 
 
10  For example Michael Codner noted in evidence to the Defence Committee that the force structure 
envisaged by the SDR would not be realised fully until 2013 (Defence Select Committee, UK Defence: 
Commitments and Resources: Uncorrected Oral Evidence, HC 381-ii, Session 2006-07, Q.242 
11  For example the Eurofighter Typhoon programme was originally conceived in the 1980s during the Cold 
War and was intended to address the threat of Soviet fighter aircraft.  
12  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.33 
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and oversees execution and feedback on the effect of execution.  This is neither 
exciting nor heroic, but it is absolutely essential for superior strategic 
performance.13 
 
 
B. Dimensions of Modern Warfare   
In addition to the relationship between theory and practical application another useful 
angle to consider in assessing the progress of defence policy are the practical 
dimensions which have shaped modern warfare generally. The impact of technology, the 
prevailing tendency in the last decade toward Coalition warfare and developments such 
as the prominence of the media in war-reporting have all played an important role in 
influencing how defence policy has progressed.  
 
The following section therefore briefly examines some of those more prominent 
dimensions of modern warfare, particularly as they relate to the West and its experience 
of war, and which have had an overt effect on British defence policy.  
 
1. The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and Network Enabled Capability  
The debate on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is commonly centred around the 
impact that new technologies – primarily information and communications technology 
(ICT) but also modern weapons systems and other platforms – have on the conduct of 
warfare, or for some the nature of war itself. The RMA is primarily associated with 
developments in the United States14 but it holds far-reaching implications for America’s 
allies and potential enemies alike.  
 
Important elements of what would ultimately come to comprise the RMA emerged during 
the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1970s, with developments in 
satellite, precision guidance and communications technology. However, the notion of 
revolutionary change only seriously took off during the 1990s.  This was partly due to the 
rapid cumulative advancements in technical capabilities and know-how. However, given 
the existence of many vital systems, the crucial impetus for the development of the RMA 
has been considered more probably to be political, and associated with the opening up 
of opportunities generated by the end of the Cold War.15 Additional impetus was provided 
by the Gulf War of 1991 during which many new advanced weapons systems were 
operationally tested for the first time.16 
 
The material foundations of the RMA can be usefully divided into three central pillars: 
  
• Sensors: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets such as satellites 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).   
 
 
 
13  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.34 
14  Principally due to the large amount of US defence spending that goes towards research and 
development.   
15  For example less emphasis was given to the possibility of facing a possible Soviet invasion of Northern 
Europe. See Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, 1998 
16  Lawrence Freedman, Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 2006, p.13 
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• Information communication: such as computers, command and control centres 
and the internet which allow the relay of information in ‘real time’. 
• Advanced weapons and munitions such as smart bombs, precision guidance, 
and cruise missiles.17   
 
However, it is the total integration of these systems, to produce what has been termed 
the ‘system of systems’, or the “sensor to shooter experience” that represents what is 
specifically novel about these changes. Taken together, C4ISTAR18 systems hold out the 
potential for the seamless collection, assessment, and communication of information in 
‘real time’, allowing force to be applied through advanced weapons systems with greater 
range, lethality and accuracy, in a directed and decisive manner. Force elements would 
thus be more agile, manoeuvrable and flexible, while the demands on logistics and 
supply organisations would be reduced.  
 
Out of the initial and somewhat exploratory ideas associated with the RMA emerged the 
more doctrinally sophisticated and operationally orientated concept of Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) in the US.19 NCW essentially focuses on the prospect of achieving 
‘dominant battlespace knowledge’ through effective and comprehensive systems 
integration.  It advocates a move away from a quantitative assessment of force to one 
that is more qualitative and defined by the attainment of information superiority, 
enhanced situational awareness and massively improved mission effectiveness.20 For the 
US these ideas are encapsulated in the concept of ‘Full Spectrum Dominance.’21  
 
As Paul Mitchell notes, “the end result of this sharing of information and awareness is the 
creation of additional combat power by enhancing the utility of information provided to 
decision-makers”.22 As the RMA and NCW have gradually worked their way into doctrine, 
these ideas have become key elements in the broad concept of force ‘transformation’.  
 
Proponents of the RMA have argued that these developments make progress toward 
overcoming the chance and uncertainty traditionally associated with war. Yet sceptics of 
the concept have questioned the purportedly revolutionary consequences of these 
developments. While the material advantages such technological changes have 
conferred have generally not been in doubt, the optimistic claim that the ‘fog of war’ 
could be dispelled is considered yet to be proven. As both Iraq and Afghanistan both 
demonstrated, friction in war undoubtedly remains.23  
 
 
 
 
17  What Freedman referred to as the “paradigmatic weapon of the RMA”. See The Revolution in Strategic 
Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, 1998, p.70 
18 Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance.  Other versions exist such as C4ISR or C4I.  
19  While the concept of networked operations, loosely conceived, had certainly been around since at least 
the Second World War, the development of NCW as an outgrowth of the RMA only truly emerged in the 
late 1990s.  
20  In a number of possible respects including tempo, responsiveness, lower risk, lower costs and higher 
profits.  See Paul Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare, Adelphi Paper 385, p.33 
21  US Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2010. A copy is available online at: 
http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf 
22  Paul Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare, Adelphi Paper 385, p.34 
23  Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, 1998, p.61 
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The main argument put forward by critics of RMA is that, regardless of technological 
advancement, the human element required to interpret information, prioritise it and then 
take decisions based upon it retains a source of fallibility for military decision making. 
Information overload on the part of individual commanders could potentially result from 
the speed of technology-enhanced intelligence gathering and communication; while the 
practicalities of implementation may also suffer. The ability of logistics and other support 
services to keep pace with rapid decision making has been highlighted.   
 
It has also been argued that excessive focus on new technologies can lead to 
information dependence and distract attention away from crucial intangibles such as 
morale, the political position of allies, and domestic and international public opinion. As 
Colin Gray has outlined, this form of “strategic tunnel vision”24 potentially downplays the 
unique value of human intelligence and perceptions of cultural and political ambiguities 
that are gleaned only from human interaction. Also, a misguided faith in the possibilities 
generated by new technologies may contribute to unrealistic military expectations, given 
that no direct causal link between better information and better military effects has been 
identified. Indeed, countries such as China have invested significant time and resources 
into the development of asymmetric technologies that would offset the qualitative 
information superiority of any enemy on the battlefield.25   
 
The fundamental cause for scepticism over the RMA, however, relates to the inherent 
difficulty of turning technological sophistication into political effect. If indeed a revolution 
is taking place, it is principally occurring at the tactical and operational levels. Strategy on 
the other hand is far more complex and success is often dependent on much more than 
technological superiority. Advanced technology may certainly enable swift military 
victories against conventional forces but this by no means guarantees the successful 
translation of that success into the comprehensive attainment of political objectives.  In 
Iraq, for example, the adoption of “Shock and awe” tactics at the outset of conflict was 
largely based on the advantages that technological superiority was perceived to confer. 
Yet the post-conflict phase of Iraqi reconstruction has been largely defined by a drawn-
out insurgency which has led to criticisms of Coalition post-war planning and the re-
assertion that “boots on the ground” is not an obsolete concept. As Freedman notes, “the 
real difficulty is that military power can only be truly judged against the political purposes 
it is intended to serve”.26 Colin Gray also notes the danger involved when technological 
overconfidence is allowed to determine political decisions: “Wise policy can be advanced 
by effective military power, but military power ceases to be strategically effective when in 
effect it is allowed into the driving seat of policy”.27  
 
 
 
 
24  Colin Gray, “The RMA and Intervention: A Sceptical View”, in Colin McInnes and Nicholas Wheeler Eds, 
Dimensions of Western Military Intervention, 2002, p.55 
25  What some analysts have referred to as the ancient martial art of “pressure point warfare” and includes 
cyberwarfare and the development of capabilities such as anti-satellite ballistic missiles. See “pressure 
point warfare: China swings the assassin’s mace”, RUSI Newsbrief, March 2007  
26  Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, 1998, p.68 
27  Colin Gray, “The RMA and Intervention: A Sceptical View”, in Colin McInnes and Nicholas Wheeler Eds, 
Dimensions of Western Military Intervention, 2002, p.57 
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a. The British Interpretation of the RMA and the Development of Network 
Enabled Capability  
While the RMA is predominantly a US-led phenomenon, America’s allies, not least the 
UK, have had to adapt to the consequences of its implications. At a technical level, policy 
has often been driven by the simple imperative not to get left behind. As Freedman 
observes “If there is too much of a gap between US capabilities and those of its 
allies…the US will not even be able to bestow these benefits because the recipients will 
be unable to take advantage of them”.28 Yet the motivation to keep pace has also been 
considered more political in nature. As Freedman has also noted: 
 
The most important allies of the US will make an effort to stay abreast of these 
technologies and to adopt them where possible, if only for purposes of 
interoperability and to gain access to US policy-making at times of crisis and 
war.29 
 
British policy appears to have been driven primarily by such imperatives, and in recent 
years the UK has adopted a limited variant of the RMA that has come to be known as 
“Network Enabled Capability”.30 The UK’s approach has essentially entailed procuring 
sufficient technological capabilities to “enable us to operate more effectively in the future 
strategic environment through the more efficient sharing and exploitation of information 
within the British Armed Forces and with our coalition partners”.31 Developing capabilities 
sufficiently to remain interoperable with the US has been a specific priority. In evidence 
to the Defence Select Committee in 2002 Admiral Sir Michael Boyce noted: 
 
we certainly do not have the sort of budget that would allow us to do probably as 
much as our United States friends, but what is going to be very important to do is 
to make sure that we do get inter-operable with the United States.32 
 
However, in contrast to the US which has placed emphasis on the wholesale 
transformation of forces, the UK’s emphasis, given the constraint on budget resources, 
has instead been on developing key enablers of operational effectiveness or, as the 
MOD has put it, “evolving the concept pragmatically”.33 Yet it has also been suggested 
that the reasons for the UK’s more tailored approach is partly cultural in the sense that 
there is a “less enthusiastic approach to all-embracing technology as a way of solving a 
lot of problems…the network is not centric to what we do... It is a rather more pragmatic, 
and some would say a rather pedestrian approach, but in my opinion it suits the British 
psyche”.34 
 
 
 
 
28  Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318, 1998, p.72 
29  Ibid 
30  This has been reflected in successive policy reviews since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.  
31  Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, Session 
2003-04, p.5 
32  Defence Select Committee, A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review, HC 93-II, Session 2002-03, 
Ev.35 
33  Ibid, Ev.2 
34  Ibid, Ev.89 
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The Strategic Defence Review in 1998 was the first policy document to consider 
seriously the role that new technologies might have on military strategy, capability and 
operational effectiveness.35  It noted the importance of developing command, control, 
communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) capabilities to exploit information as a ‘force multiplier’.  
These really constituted only exploratory commitments and the SDR talked more of the 
potential of these technologies rather than of developing a systematic conceptual or 
doctrinal framework for their use. 
 
The idea of systematic integration of the new technologies into the Armed Forces was 
first comprehensively laid down in 2002 “New Chapter” to the SDR. That paper expected 
that the development of new technologies in the area of sensors, networks and strike 
assets would deliver greater precision in the control of operations and the application of 
force, as well as speed of effect and improved force protection.36 While the New Chapter 
recognised the wider defence applicability of these technologies, it primarily presented 
them as contributing to improved effectiveness in counterterrorism operations.37  As the 
MOD made clear in a memorandum to the Defence Committee in October 2002: 
 
The detailed implications…of a further shift in investment towards NCC for force 
structures and equipment programmes are being considered as part of the 
Department’s normal planning process, and we expect to be able to reflect the 
outcome of this work in a further White Paper next year.38 
 
The concept of NEC in a more developed, sophisticated and broader form subsequently 
emerged with the publication of the 2003 Defence White Paper and its ‘Future 
Capabilities’ chapter of 2004. Those documents placed significantly greater emphasis on 
networked capabilities and saw them as integral components of the recently developed 
effects based approach to defence planning.39 The opportunities arising from NEC were 
more fully discussed in an accompanying MOD Handbook which explained that NEC:  
 
offers decisive advantage through the timely provision and exploitation of 
information and intelligence to enable effective decision-making and agile actions.  
NEC will be implemented through the coherent and progressive development of 
Defence equipment, software, processes, structures, and individual and collective 
training, underpinned by the development of a secure, robust and extensive 
network of networks.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35  See Library Research Paper 04/71, The Defence White Paper, p.10 
36  Ministry of Defence, SDR: A New Chapter, Cm 5566, Session 2001-02, p.15 
37  The New Chapter to the Strategic Defence review had initially been prompted by the developments of 11 
September 2001.  
38  Defence Select Committee, A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review, HC 93-II, Session 2002-03, 
Ev.1. NCC refers to network centric capabilities which was the MOD’s initial interpretation of this concept. 
NCC eventually became NEC – network enabled capabilities.  
39  Effects based operations is examined in greater detail in section I B of Library Research Paper RP08/57.  
40  MOD Handbook, Network Enabled Capability, Joint Service Publication 777, p.2 
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In the more recent Defence Plan 2008-2012, which was published by the MOD in June 
2008, the delivery of NEC was recognised as a key objective over the next four years: 
 
Network Enabled Capability will deliver benefit by enabling decision superiority 
across both the battlespace and the business space. It is considerably more 
diverse than equipment and improved technical solutions; ultimately it is cultural 
with implications for doctrine, organisation, structure, training, tactics and 
procedures. It will enable situational awareness and the command and control 
required to plan, execute and co-ordinate precise and effective actions conducted 
as part of a comprehensive approach to operations, by providing the required 
degree of national, international and cross-departmental interoperability at all 
levels of command.41  
 
Some commentators have feared that NEC development is a justification for platform 
cuts, based on the argument that fewer, more technologically advanced platforms are 
required to deliver the same level of intended effect. They have criticised this premise 
however on the grounds that qualitative improvements are irrelevant when a platform 
cannot be in two places at once and that such a trend is particularly dangerous when 
forces are expected to deploy on concurrent operations.42 
 
Some concern has also been expressed about the ability of the UK to afford such an 
ambitious programme of change. In response to the publication of the 2003 White Paper, 
an editorial in the Financial Times noted: 
 
Intelligent networks to link fewer, more sophisticated military platforms are 
supposed to enable the new system to operate.  But to think that can be done 
within a defence budget that is frozen in real terms is fanciful.43 
 
These financial concerns are particularly acute given that the main NEC-enabling 
technologies are due to enter service at a time of peak expenditure in the defence 
equipment plan, with the introduction of some major platforms also expected in that 
period.44 Many expect that, given these budgetary pressures, there will be a need for 
some form of trade-off between planned equipment procurements and investment in 
NEC-enabling technologies.45 
 
However, concerns over NEC have not been restricted to financial matters. The 
intellectual and conceptual underpinnings of the ideas associated with the RMA more 
generally have also been subject to questioning within the context of NEC. As Bill 
Roberts has put it “network-enabled capabilities sometime promise far more than they 
 
 
 
41  Ministry of Defence, Defence Plan including Government Expenditure Plans 2008-2012, Cm7385, 
Session 2007-08 
42  Defence Select Committee, UK Defence: Commitments and Resources: Uncorrected Oral Evidence, HC 
381-ii, Session 2006-07 
43  ‘Wanting it all – new military thinking means more cash or fewer options”’, The Financial Times, 12 
December 2003. 
44  Such as the A400M strategic transport aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, the two new aircraft 
carriers for the Royal Navy and the Future Rapid Effects System family of armoured vehicles. 
45  This is examined in greater detail in section II D of RP08/57. 
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can deliver, because they appear to point to a bright upland, in which computers will do 
an awful lot more than actually they are able to do”.46 
 
2. The Privatisation of Conflict  
One of the defining features of modern warfare has been the proliferation of private 
companies operating in the defence and security sector, largely in relation to the 
provision of military support services, although in some instances in relation to the 
provision of military force itself. Definitions of what constitutes a ‘private military security 
company’ (PMSC) have been consistently difficult to set down in any all-encompassing 
way. The profile of such companies has therefore tended toward the negative, with 
interest focusing on the activities of those companies that have provided combat and 
security forces rather than logistics support for the military.  
 
Historically, the hiring of private military services was regarded as ‘normal practice’47 and, 
after widespread use in the middle ages, began to decline only with the growth of 
standing armies, the increased use of conscription, and the strengthening of the nation 
state in the late eighteenth century. While still prevalent in the nineteenth century, given 
the enthusiasm for economic liberalism, the scope for private providers of military 
services gradually declined until by the mid-twentieth century they had all but 
disappeared.48 With the wars of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s there was a small 
but much publicised rise in private military provision and mercenary activity. The key 
development in their proliferation, however, was with the US military’s growing reliance 
on complex technological systems and a concomitant reliance on contractors and firms 
to maintain and operate them. That trend intensified under the Reagan administration 
and thus served as the “contractual, conceptual and ideological baseline for the 
subcontracting boom of the 1990s”.49 During the Gulf War in 1990-1991, for example, the 
ratio of private contractors to military personnel in the US-led Coalition was estimated at 
one per 50 US personnel.50 
 
David Shearer highlights a number of further reasons for the rapid proliferation of PMSC 
in the 1990s. The ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War dramatically 
reduced the size of Western armed forces, which both encouraged military 
establishments to offset these reductions by contracting out many support functions and 
flooded the private military labour market with ex-soldiers.51 The declining standards of 
armed forces in the Third World also increased demand for capable combat forces 
and/or expert training and advice; while the spread of intra-state wars and civil conflict 
combined with a Western reluctance to intervene during this period compelled many 
governments to seek private military support.   
 
 
 
 
46  Defence Select Committee, A New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review, HC 93-II, Session 2002-03, 
Q.512 
47  David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316, p.13 
48  Dominick Donald, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 
66, p.7 
49  Ibid, p.8 
50  “The business of war gets murkier”, The Financial Times, 18 August 2003  
51  David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316, p.27 and Dominick Donald, 
After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 66, p.8 
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Also, as Dominick Donald notes, the RMA only served to accelerate this trend of heavy 
reliance on specialised contractors, particularly in the US. Indeed by 2000 it had been 
argued that the US could not go to war without contractors.52 In the US the public-private 
spheres had also become inextricably interwoven, with many company directors and 
board members having served previously in US administrations.53  
 
In the UK, though many other areas of government were privatised, the military remained 
largely unaffected. British security companies had fewer commercial links to the UK’s 
defence establishment. A number of security firms such as Control Risks had been 
engaged in the mining and energy sectors overseas, but the emergence of Sandline 
International and the publicity it attracted in the late 1990s54 catapulted the issue of 
private military companies into the public realm. 
 
Since the invasion of Iraq there has been a step change in the number, use and public 
awareness of private military and security companies. Again this has largely been a US 
phenomenon. Although reliable figures are hard to obtain, estimates by the US Central 
Command put the number of contractors operating in Iraq under US government 
contracts by December 2006 at over 100,000. Those personnel were supporting logistics 
provision, security for reconstruction, civilian reconstruction and, unique to the US, in the 
provision of military force.55 Donald has referred to this significant rise in the use of 
private contractors associated with the conflict as the ‘Iraq bubble.’56 However, it has not 
been the commercialisation of many military roles that has been at the heart of the 
debate over the use of PMSCs, but the regulation, accountability, control, and legality of 
their activities. 57 
 
Concerns over the impact of PMSCs on military operations, ranging from tactical to 
strategic levels, have also been expressed recently. This has become particularly 
apparent in counter-insurgency operations, such as those in Iraq, where engagement 
with the local population is considered to have been undermined by the activities of 
some PMSCs operating with the Coalition.58 Problems have also emerged over the 
extent to which they should be integrated in, or attached to, regular force components.59 
 
Given the concerns noted above, organisations such as the British Association of Private 
Security Companies (BAPSC) have been launched “to promote, enhance and regulate 
 
 
 
52  Dominick Donald, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 
66, p.9 
53  For example, Former CIA director and current Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, sat on the board of 
Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a major defence contractor. 
54  In 1997 Sandline International was involved in a $36 million contract with the government in Papua New 
Guinea and in 1998 the Arms to Africa affair arose based upon Sandline’s sale of arms to the 
government of Sierra Leone.  See Dominick Donald, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies 
After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 66, p.11 
55  The use of PMSCs in Iraq is examined in greater detail in Library Standard note SN/IA/3120, The 
Regulation of Private military and Security Companies and their Role in Iraq, 31 May 2007.  
56  Dominick Donald, After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 
66 
57  Alistair Campbell, “Mercenaries” World Today, p.21 
58  As Alistair Campbell noted in The World Today, “Blackwater had engaged in 195 ‘escalation of force’ 
incidents since 2005, an average of 1.4 per week”. (Alistair Campbell, “Mercenaries”, World Today, p.21) 
59  On all these points see Campbell’s World Today article, p20-22. 
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the interests and activities of UK-based firms and companies that provide armed security 
services in countries outside the UK and to represent the interests and activities of 
Members in matters of proposed or actual legislation”.60 This has equated to a form of 
self-regulation and has been regarded largely as a reaction to events in Iraq. The current 
state of the sector in the UK has been usefully summarised by Dominick Donald: 
 
There is a British PSC sector, distinct from its US counterpart and for the moment 
largely dependent on a different revenue stream (commercial rather than 
governmental)…It is committed to being perceived as a legitimate, defensive 
actor acting in accordance with British and wider Western interests and operating 
under some kind of regulatory framework.  It sees a return to the provision of 
combat services as commercial death…It believes it has substantial expertise 
that it would like to put at governments’ wider disposal.61 
 
However, as noted above, the privatisation of conflict has not merely been focused on 
the provision of combat or security forces. For over a decade the trend toward 
outsourcing military logistics provision as a means of achieving efficiency savings, 
“freeing up” essential military personnel for more frontline duties or reducing troop 
commitments overseas, has been prevalent. In the UK, the tendency toward the 
outsourcing of military logistics and support services first began in a meaningful way with 
the Conservative Frontline First review in 1994. At the time the desire to achieve 
efficiency savings coincided with the pressure to reap the “peace dividend” that came 
with the end of the Cold War. This trend accelerated under the Labour government and 
incorporated not only an increase in the private sector provision of military support 
services, but also an increase in the privatisation of certain sectors of the defence 
establishment62 and, what has been considered more controversial, the move to 
outsource the provision of frontline operational services. The most high profile example 
of this has been the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) programme which is 
expected to deliver a privatised solution to air-to-air refuelling capabilities across the 
Services.   
 
3. Coalition Warfare 
Typically, when Western forces go to war in the modern context they do so as members 
of multinational coalitions. While by no means a new phenomenon, the trend towards 
coalition operations has greatly increased in recent years and particularly since the end 
of the Cold War.  As Paul Mitchell notes, “coalitions are largely about scarcity, in terms of 
either resources or political legitimacy”.63 This dual scarcity perhaps explains why 
coalitions have become such a prominent feature of Western military operations. On the 
latter issue of political legitimacy, Michael Ignatieff explains that: 
 
 
 
 
60  See: http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp 
61  Dominick Donald, After The Bubble: British Private Security Companies After Iraq, RUSI Whitehall Paper 
66, p.75 
62  In 2001 the government part-privatised the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency which resulted in 
the flotation of QinetiQ in 2003. In 2006 the Government announced that the Defence Aviation and 
Repair Agency and the Army Base Repair Organisation would also be part-privatised.  
63  Paul T. Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare, Adelphi Paper 385, p.8 
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The legitimacy of…military operations overseas depends on persuading other 
states to join as coalition partners.  Indeed, coalition warfare is increasingly seen 
as the future of war.  It is a sign of how the political culture of international 
relations has changed in the era of the UN Charter that violence vested in the 
national interest of a single country is less likely to command the assent of the 
world than violence vested in a coalition.64 
 
Coalition action, whether undertaken through formal institutional structures or through 
the very recent manifestation of ‘coalitions of the willing’, can bestow vital political 
legitimacy on the use of force when other formal avenues have been blocked for political 
reasons. 
 
Another explanation for the increase in coalition operations in recent years lies in the 
new imperatives created by the emerging security environment and the increased 
pressure on both financial and capability resources.65  The inherent complexity of modern 
warfare often means that there is a need for a wide variety of skills and competencies 
that cannot be provided by one nation alone. There is thus a requirement to pool 
capabilities and draw upon national specialisations. The expense of modern military 
operations is another powerful motivation, encouraging nations to spread the costs 
across the members of a coalition. Also, the exponential increase in the number of 
multinational United Nations peacekeeping missions since 1989 has placed a premium 
on developing the necessary levels of interoperability and burden sharing that coalition 
operations demand. 
 
Even if coalitions are becoming the norm in most of the operations undertaken by 
Western Armed Forces, one underlying feature is that every coalition is unique: “they 
vary in composition, the degree to which they are legally underwritten and the nature and 
capability of their military structure”.66 This has been, and will continue to be, the case 
even if campaigns are conducted within the framework of an existing alliance system 
such as NATO or emerging frameworks such as the European Security and Defence 
Policy.  Each operation will have a different political context and involve contributions by 
members of varying sizes and capabilities. The resultant strength of any coalition will 
therefore depend on a combination of different factors including the degree of political 
consensus amongst members, the power and influence of its leading nation or 
organisation, the breadth of international public support, and the military assets available 
to it.  
 
However, coalition operations raise all sorts of problems “from the practical to the 
political and cultural”.67 The use of coalitions, while increasingly politically and 
operationally necessary in the modern context, can often lead to sub-optimal military 
outcomes as a result of the inherent need for compromise and the difficulties caused by 
working with other nations which may not be able to meet their force generation 
 
 
 
64  Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 2000, p.205 
65  See Paul T. Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare, Adelphi Paper 385, p.19 
66  Christopher Dandeker, “Coalitions and the future of UK Security Policy” RUSI Whitehall Paper, 2000 
67  Roger H. Palin, Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 294 
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obligations or have placed caveats on the use of forces,68 may not have the full domestic 
support of their electorates,69 or may have different opinions on military tactics and 
targeting.70 Furthermore, the length of time it takes to form a coalition, often resulting 
from a combination of all these issues, means the optimal or appropriate time for 
intervention may be missed. 
 
Coalitions are therefore characterised by an ongoing process of cooperation, 
confrontation, competition and compromise among their members in order to find the 
necessary consensus from which to move forward and conduct operations. Any nation’s 
influence and weight in such discussions is often based on the commitment of 
capabilities, whether they have a certain specialisation required by the coalition or 
whether they bring significant political or moral ‘added value’ to the campaign.   
 
At the political level, there is also a difficulty in developing agreement among allies as to 
the nature of threats and how best to deal with them.  This has been most clearly 
demonstrated by the different perceptions and analyses of the threat from international 
terrorism and how best to deal with it, between Europe on the one hand, which has 
emphasised measures aimed at addressing underlying root causes, and the US on the 
other, which has emphasised coercive action and the use of extraordinary powers. Such 
problems make the formation of coalitions politically difficult. This has been considered a 
particular dilemma for countries like the UK which has historically maintained a unique 
position, with the cultivation of the special relationship with the US on the one hand and 
the need to demonstrate an allegiance to Europe on the other.  
 
A specific problem or – depending upon perception – an opportunity, is the impact of 
new technologies.71 In many respects network centric warfare holds out the potential for 
greatly enhancing the ability of multinational coalitions to work together. However, the 
speed at which the US is developing high-tech networked systems threatens to leave 
other nations behind, thus jeopardising the ability to maintain interoperability with US 
operations and systems. This has strategic implications for the allies of the US, not least 
the UK. As Paul Mitchell comments: “It is axiomatic that the potential for failure in 
coalition operations exists should partners diverge too greatly in terms of their ability to 
operate together”.72 As noted above, it is this ability to retain interoperability and 
influence in US-led operations that has to a large degree underpinned the UK’s approach 
to the development of Network Enabled Capability.  
 
On a more general level the trend towards coalition operations has clear implications for 
the UK. Michael Codner remarked:  
 
When the British Government does decide to commit forces to operations abroad, 
they will in most cases operate in cooperation, coordination and in full 
 
 
 
68  For example the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan. This is examined in greater detail in sections I 
F and II B of RP08/57. 
69  In 2004 for example Spain withdrew its forces from Iraq following the election of a new government under 
José Luis Zapatero.  
70  For example during the Kosovo conflict in 1999. This is examined in greater detail in section I F of 
RP08/57.   
71  The revolution in military affairs and network enabled capability is examined in section I B. 
72  See Paul T. Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare, Adelphi Paper 385, p.46 
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combination with Allies, Partners and friends.  Coalition operations will be 
frequently ad hoc and coalitions of the willing will be the norm.  Consequently the 
array of capabilities that will be present in a coalition force will not be 
predictable.73     
 
The MOD’s Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) noted:  
 
For nearly all war-fighting operations, the UK will be acting as a member of a 
coalition force. These coalitions may not always precisely reflect existing 
alliances.  We should look to encourage capable and willing nations to develop 
complementary military capabilities, and develop training and other links with 
probable partners… Coalitions may include countries with disparate interests and 
perceptions.  Decision-making processes during such operations may be slower 
and rules of engagement limited by public opinion across the coalition.74 
 
As a RUSI Whitehall Paper has argued: 
 
Coalitions of the willing under the aegis and sponsorship of established and 
legitimate international organisations will be a fact of political and military life.  
Therefore, the UK must position itself in such a way as to have the greatest 
possible influence over the constitution and conduct of such coalitions.75 
 
To this end the Whitehall Paper recommends that the UK maintains political influence in 
key institutions and procures enough capabilities to co-lead a coalition in which the US is 
not involved, or enough to influence US policy when it is. These considerations are 
considered vital for the UK’s ability to ‘shape’ any coalition it finds itself in. Ensuring that 
the British Armed Forces are structured and equipped appropriately to this end has thus 
become a major aspect of defence policy.  
 
4. The Development of “Jointery”  
The development of ‘jointery’ is essentially the progress towards increased 
organisational, functional and operational integration between the individual armed 
services. In the UK it was a gradual process that began largely at higher Ministry levels 
and, towards the end of the 1990s, culminated in organisational changes at an 
operational and, in many instances, tactical level. 
 
In many respects this is a continuation of the debate that developed throughout the 
second half of twentieth century, between those who argued for strong autonomous 
Service departments and those who looked to a single Ministry to bring about complete 
centralisation in the form of centralised control, functional organisation and tri-service 
planning.   
 
As Matthew Uttley notes, “The period between 1945 and the end of the Cold War 
ushered in significant changes to the higher management of UK defence”, which saw the 
 
 
 
73  Michael Codner, “The United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence Review: Strategic Options”, RUSI Journal,  
August 1997 
74  Ministry of Defence, The Future Strategic Context for Defence, 2001 
75  Christopher Dandeker, “Coalitions and the future of UK Security Policy” RUSI Whitehall Paper, 2000 
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“strengthened role of the MOD and the Defence Staff at the expense of the autonomy of 
the three armed services: a trend in response…to the growing complexity of military 
planning, the need for coordination including weapons acquisition and the imperative of 
reducing scope for inter-service rivalries for defence roles and missions”.76   
 
This trend intensified after the Cold War, and the move towards systematic integration 
was driven by two key factors. The first was financial, in the form of the downward trend 
of the defence budget and pressure from the Treasury to achieve cost savings by 
bringing the three services together into joint commands. The second was changing 
threat perceptions and, in particular, the demise of the potential for large-scale conflict in 
Europe and the rise of more diffuse threats on a global scale which required flexible 
forces capable of projecting power to meet the spectrum of new global risks.77 In short, 
the development of a more joined-up approach was both a means of improving efficiency 
and a pragmatic reaction to the nature of modern operations. 
 
In August 1997 Group Captain Campbell noted in the RUSI Journal that, since the end of 
the Cold War, “most operations have been joint and combined, or both, and there is 
widespread recognition that this will be the pattern in future… Even notionally single-
service operations are likely to require significant support from at least one other service 
in future”.78 
 
In institutional terms, this trend toward ‘jointery’ progressed through changes 
implemented in the 1990s and was consolidated towards the end of the Major 
government by the creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ),79 the Joint 
Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) and the Joint Services Command and Staff College 
(JSCSC).  By the mid 1990s jointery had become orthodoxy. Nevertheless, the 
opportunity for the incoming Labour Government to consolidate, further develop, and 
accelerate the joint approach was noted.  
 
The Strategic Defence Review in 1998 placed significant emphasis on the joint approach 
and gave greater direction to the process:  
 
While single-Service skills and ethos will remain the essential foundation of all our 
military capability, most future operations will be conducted by joint forces 
composed of fighting units from individual Services.  These will be under joint (tri-
Service) command and control, drawing on joint intelligence capabilities and with 
joint logistics.  We must therefore also build the joint approach into our doctrine 
and our preparation and training for operations.80   
 
Underlining this message, the Joint Vision Statement, outlined in the supporting essays, 
noted that “success in modern warfare depends on joint teamwork. Battles and wars are 
 
 
 
76  Matthew Uttley in Dorman et al, Britain and Defence 1945-2000, 2001, p.90 
77  Matthew Uttley in Dorman et al, Britain and Defence 1945-2000, 2001, p.91 
78  A. Campbell, “A British Joint General Staff – imperial throwback or strategic imperative?”, RUSI Journal, 
August 1997 
79  The PJHQ is based at Northwood. 
80  Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm 3999, Session 1997-98, p.21 
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won by maritime, ground and air forces operating effectively together in support of 
shared military objectives”.81 
 
At the capabilities level, the SDR replaced the JRDF with new Joint Rapid Reaction 
Forces which would provide a pool of readily-available, rapidly-deployable, high-
capability forces from all three Services, designed to have enhanced firepower, mobility 
and protection.82  These forces were designed to be available at short notice, composed 
of high-readiness forces (including a Special Forces component) for initial deployment 
and a pool of follow-up forces held at slightly less readiness. Among other joint 
initiatives, the SDR created a Joint Helicopter Command, a Joint Doctrine and Concepts 
Centre83 and a Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence Regiment. 
 
There was also a recognised need for greater joint integration of command and control,84 
logistics85 and transport86 to reflect the operational demands of expeditionary warfare. 
Also, to prepare for joint operations, the SDR recognised the need for improved joint 
training and exercises. 
 
In response to the proposals set out in the SDR, the Defence Committee noted that 
jointery is: 
 
generally an inevitable, as well as a welcome development…it must not however, 
be allowed to damage the single service ethos.  Nor should it be allowed to 
become a mechanism by which the Services conduct their traditional horse 
trading on capabilities away from public scrutiny.87 
 
The New Chapter to the SDR and the 2003 White Paper saw no deviation away from the 
concept of jointery, which was by then becoming institutionally and operationally 
enshrined. The development of the idea of network enabled capability and effects based 
operations served only to accelerate this process. Indeed jointery has not been confined 
to the capabilities or organisational sphere. The Armed Forces Act 2006 adopted a “tri-
service” approach to military law and subsequently consolidated the three existing 
Service Discipline Acts into a single system of Service law.88  
 
While the development of jointery has been widely endorsed as a desirable process, it 
has, however raised a number of issues, the most important of which have been 
 
 
 
81  Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: Supporting Essays, Cm3999, Session 1997-98, 
Essay 8-1 
82  The SDR planned for the JRRFs to be operational in 2001. 
83  This was set up on 1 September 1999 and is tasked with developing joint doctrine and the future joint 
vision. 
84  To this end the responsibilities of the Chief of Joint Operations were increased (placing him on a similar 
budgetary level as the Service Chiefs) and a new post of Chief of Joint Operations and Training was 
established. 
85  To this end the SDR planned for a new Joint Force Logistics Component Headquarters to be established 
and the separate Service logistics brought together under a new Chief of Defence Logistics. 
86  To this end a new Joint Defence Transport and Movements organisation was created. 
87  Defence Select Committee, The Strategic Defence Review, HC 138, Session 1997-98, para.424 
88  Further information on the Armed Forces Act 2006 is available in Library Research Papers RP05/75, 
Background to the Forthcoming Armed Forces Bill, 11 November 2005 and RP05/86, The Armed Forces 
Bill, 7 December 2005 
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succinctly expressed by Matthew Uttley. He notes that from an economic perspective 
jointery resembles cartel and monopoly, which “may enable the armed services to 
collude or entrench inefficient practices”; that jointery may not facilitate closer 
cooperation between the services but rather displace inter-service rivalries to other 
areas; that there is a risk of “minimalist jointery”, whereby a tri-service approach is only 
adopted in peripheral military functions; and that the services “may use the mantra of 
jointery to obscure the flow of information to policy-makers on the costs and benefits of 
individual service procurement proposals that has traditionally been generated by overt 
inter-service competition”.89 
 
Despite the significant advances over the last decade, jointery is by no means 
considered a completed process and important questions remain over its precise nature 
and end point. In modern complex crises which subsequently entail a prolonged period 
of post-conflict reconstruction, the Armed Forces often find themselves working 
alongside a range of actors including other government departments and agencies, non-
governmental organisation (NGOs) and humanitarian organisations. There is thus a 
growing pressure on the Armed Forces to not only cooperate and coordinate more 
effectively between the separate Services, but also with the other actors who play 
increasingly important roles in achieving political objectives. This has led to the 
emergence of the concept of the ‘comprehensive approach’ which an MOD Joint 
Discussion Note describes as: 
 
a conceptual framework which could be used to reinvigorate the existing, Cabinet 
Office-led, approach to coordinating the objectives and activities of Government 
Departments in identifying, analysing, planning and executing national responses 
to complex situations.  Post-operational analysis of situations and crises at home 
and abroad has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of a joined-up and 
cross-discipline approach if lasting and desirable outcomes are to be identified 
and achieved… The realisation of national strategic objectives inevitably relies on 
a combination of diplomatic, military and economic instruments of power, together 
with an independent package of developmental and humanitarian activity and a 
customised, agile and sensitive influence and information effort. In seeking to 
strengthen, and hasten, the formation of these partnerships within an institutional 
framework and in support of collective ministerial decision-making, it is hoped that 
the CA [comprehensive approach] could help encourage, at the earliest 
opportunity, the forestalling, containment or permanent resolution of crises.90 
 
Some analysts have suggested that, in the future, jointery will perhaps develop further 
along these lines in order to improve the effectiveness of the Armed Forces in the 
modern battlespace. Indeed, both reference to effects based operations in recent official 
defence documents and the development of the doctrine of the ‘comprehensive 
approach’ reflects these changes. 
 
 
 
 
89  Matthew Uttley in Dorman et al, Britain and Defence 1945-2000, 2001, p.91 
90  Ministry of Defence, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, January 2006. A copy 
of this document is available online at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/BEE7F0A4-C1DA-45F8-9FDC-
7FBD25750EE3/0/dcdc21_jdn4_05.pdf  
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5. The Media and Conflict  
For most of the twentieth century, media coverage of conflict has been tightly controlled, 
heavily censored and, in the case of some countries and organisations, used primarily as 
a propaganda tool. Vietnam was described as the first true media war, but since then 
there has been an obvious and exponential growth in media penetration of conflict, its 
conduct and its aftermath.  
 
The increased access of the mass media represents one of the most important contexts 
in which modern wars are waged. Its most recognisable features are 24-hour satellite 
television news channels, live broadcasts from war zones, and journalists embedded 
with infantry units reporting from the frontline. Consequently the “conduct of war has 
become more transparent in the past 75 years, and the distance between home and the 
battlefield has diminished”.91 A number of scholars have observed that, for Western 
audiences, war has become something akin to a spectator-sport: a spectacle that 
arouses emotions but does not require any active participation.92  
 
The role of the media can vary widely. It can be a means of prompting a military 
response to humanitarian emergencies (the so-called ‘CNN effect’); a psychological 
weapon used by enemies; or a tool of governments seeking to arouse support for an 
intervention. In any of these roles it can play an increasingly important part in 
determining the course of war and how it is perceived. As Kenneth Payne has noted 
“Information and perception have become vitally important…the media are in the war”.93   
 
In many respects, the media itself has become “the decisive theatre of operations”94 or a 
virtual battleground. As Michael Ignatieff states, “journalists [have been] turned, willing or 
otherwise, into combatants”95 with the potential to affect greatly the course of events.  
The media has become the crucial intermediary between the actual operations on the 
ground, the wider public, and the political leadership. The importance of these 
developments is magnified in modern democracies, where public support or approval for 
military action “which sustains the will to fight”96 can be a crucial determinant of strategic 
success. 
 
For strategists and commanders this presents significant challenges. They not only have 
to worry about events on the front-line, but also about how those events are being 
presented to audiences at home. As Payne has observed, “combatants…have a vested 
interest in what journalists are saying”.97 Given modern standards of media impartiality, 
freedom of speech and independence from the state, commanders can never presume a 
wholly sympathetic and supportive press. Out of this mix a complex relationship of 
mutual dependence emerges. Commanders cannot escape the media presence and its 
 
 
 
91  Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 2000, p.193 
92  Colin McInnes, Spectator Sport Warfare: The West and Contemporary Warfare, 2002 and Michael 
Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 2000 
93  Kenneth Payne, “The Media at War”. RUSI Journal, February 2008, p.17 
94  Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 2000, p.191 
95  Ibid, p.193 
96  Ibid, p.192 
97  Kenneth Payne, “The Media at War”. RUSI Journal, February 2008 
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strategic importance, while journalists require the approval and protection of the military 
to allow them to report from the heart of a conflict. Strategists not only have to consider 
how to ‘manage’ the media, but also to think through the consequences of their actions 
and how they may be presented.   
 
At the political and strategic level, the calculations may be of a different nature.  Leaders 
must ensure their official proclamations broadly reflect reality, otherwise risk a loss of 
credibility should those claims be discredited subsequently by the media.  As Smith 
notes, “never lie to the press, whether to deceive them or the opponent.  You will in time 
be found out, with the result that your ability to communicate with the people will be 
jeopardised”.98  
 
These concerns are further complicated by the increasing use of the media as a weapon 
in the hands of the West’s enemies. As Ignatieff recounts, during the Kosovo conflict in 
1999 Milosevic sought to “use Western media to exploit grisly incidents and undermine 
popular support for the war at home”.99  Al Qaeda has also proved adept at manipulating 
the media through its As Sahab Media propaganda arm. This has represented one of the 
crucial transformations engendered by the media revolution. Western publics now have 
the ability to witness instantly the effect of the use of force by their own militaries, 
causing many to question its acceptability, even if images of suffering in foreign countries 
compelled them to demand intervention in the first place.  
 
In order to deal with these problems, the concept of ‘strategic communications’ has 
emerged and has been discussed at length by Lawrence Freedman in his book The 
Transformation of Strategic Affairs. His central point is the need for a convincing ‘story’ 
or ‘narrative’ that acts as a legitimising framework for Western interventions and which, 
even in the face of set-backs, mistakes, and rising civilian and military casualties, is able 
to sustain a critical mass of public acceptance and support. Freedman concludes that 
such a narrative should be based on liberal values.  At a more practical level, this idea is 
adopted by Rupert Smith who argues that there is a need for a narrator who “explains to 
the audience what has happened, its significance and where events might lead”.100 Given 
that modern conflicts waged by democratic states can be won or lost in the minds of their 
publics, winning the ‘narrative battle’ has consequently become a vital strategic concern. 
 
The importance of the media in modern warfare has been clearly recognised in the 
British military. For instance in evidence to the Defence Select Committee in March 2007 
Air Chief Marshall Sir Brian Burridge noted that: 
 
I think that the capacity of any ministry of defence whose forces are in harms way 
to deal with a 24-hour international media that is vastly in excess of anything…in 
the past… The visual management of the images that come back from a theatre 
of war now takes almost as much effort as commanding the war itself if you want 
to do it properly.101 
 
 
 
98  Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, 2005, p.393 
99  Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 2000, p.193 
100  Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, 2005, p.391 
101  Defence Select Committee, UK Defence: Commitments and Resources: Uncorrected Oral Evidence, 
HC381-ii, Session 2006-07 
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In a speech on the ‘virtual battleground’ at Kings College London in February 2006, 
former Defence Secretary John Reid stated: 
 
Technology has enabled, for the first time, real-time media scrutiny of war, on a 
scale and a level of intrusiveness inconceivable only a few decades ago… The 
actions of our armed forces, at home and abroad, have never been under greater 
scrutiny than they are today. Our forces are operating - in this hazardous new 
environment - under a microscope and that microscope is here to stay.102 
 
In the UK ‘media management’ has grown in importance. Indeed, the MOD has 
published a ‘Green Book’ which outlines the procedures that the MOD will adopt when 
working with the media during military operations. As Richard Holmes has also 
observed, media contacts in the military have become increasingly centralised, with 
single-service one-star Directors of Corporate Communications removed from post for 
fear that these individuals might be “off-message”.103 
 
6. Public Attitudes to War 
Historically, and in general terms, war had been seen as a natural and virtuous activity.  
This view was increasingly rejected, however, during the twentieth century following two 
World Wars and the prospect of nuclear confrontation in a cold war that lasted almost 45 
years. This change of attitude, in particular in the latter half of the 20th century, was 
accompanied by post-war social trends including mass consumerism, shrinking family 
sizes, the decline of civic militarism, the democratisation of most areas of life, the 
reconceptualisation of masculinity, and the growth of an increasingly hedonistic and 
individualistic youth culture.104 Ken Booth has summarised the effect of these changes: 
 
Historically, military force was a ‘normal’ aspect of international relations.  
However, questioning traditional assumptions about its utility has been one of the 
characteristic features of Western strategic discourse since the mid-1960s.  In the 
light of a lost war in Vietnam, nuclear overkill, and endless struggle in Northern 
Ireland and a perceived Western failure to translate military power into diplomatic 
effectiveness, it has often been claimed that armed forces are not as useful as 
formerly.  At best they are dismissed as ‘intellectual time-lags’; at worst they are 
criticised as being counter-productive and dangerous.105 
 
Also, as militaries in the West have become both smaller and more professionalised, the 
gap between civil society and the military has increased. The overriding dynamic is that 
the public has become increasingly detached from the experience of war, despite the 
extent of media exposure to it (examined above). This has led many commentators to 
point to the emergence of distinct divide between civil society and the military.  In a 
speech in 2006 the then Defence Secretary John Reid noted that, 
 
 
 
 
102  John Reid, ‘The Challenges of Modern War’, Speech at Kings College London, 20 February 2006. 
103  Richard Holmes, ‘Soldiers and Society’, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Annual Lecture, 10 May 
2006, p.14 
104  Jeremy Black, War and Disorder in the 21st Century, 2004 
105  Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, 1979, p.76 
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First of all, our context is a level of understanding about what soldiers do which 
has fallen amongst our civilian population over time. The last conscript left the 
British armed forces 45 years ago. There is an argument that even since then - 
despite seeing and reading more than ever about the work of the services - the 
public have a continually looser grasp of what it means to be a soldier in this new 
security environment than was the case a generation ago.106 
  
As Colin McInnes notes, civilian publics “may empathise but do not experience; they may 
sympathise but do not suffer”.107 Michael Codner writing in the RUSI Journal in April 2007 
discussed this need for a better understanding of the military among the general public:  
 
A fundamental element of the rebuilding of a national consensus over the military 
instrument is that the nation as a whole, and not just particular governments, 
accepts its responsibility for the wellbeing of its military and their dependents. 
And there needs to be a better understanding in the electorate of its military and 
the demands that are made on it. Education in this respect is not a matter simply 
for government or the Services. Representative politicians have a particularly 
important role to play in their communities as well as in Parliaments and 
councils.108  
 
Such sentiments have been accompanied by advances in disease control and famine 
prevention, for instance, which have led to a rejection of fatalism and a widespread 
reluctance to accept the hazards of conflict.109 This is reflected in the casualty sensitivity 
of the West, particularly when the probability of the success of a campaign is in question 
or when the war is fought out of choice, rather than necessity.   
 
These cultural transformations – what Jeremy Black has termed the Revolution in 
Attitudes towards the Military,110 - has led to a transformation in prevailing social values, 
beliefs and ethics. Other noticeable trends include the growing polarisation of religious 
belief, a growing concern for universal human rights, and the emergence of prosperity as 
the overriding socio-political value. The convergence of these social currents has led to 
the lowering of the threshold, or contraction of the public ‘moral space,’ for justifying the 
use of force. Consequently, politicians are often compelled to go to much greater lengths 
to secure legitimacy for the wars they want to fight, particularly with respect to large-
scale and protracted campaigns. 
 
It might be argued that there is little political leaders can do to alter the fact that, when 
they contemplate the use of force, they will be faced with a sceptical ‘post-military’ public 
who perhaps do not fully comprehend the necessity of using force, particularly for the 
purposes of enforcing international law or preventing crimes against humanity. For 
example, in an ICM poll for the BBC published in March 2008, 48 per cent of 
respondents opposed British involvement in Afghanistan (though this had fallen from 53 
per cent in 2006 when ICM last asked the question).111 
 
 
 
106  John Reid, ‘The Challenges of Modern War’, Speech at Kings College London, 20 February 2006. 
107  Colin McInnes, Spectator Sport Warfare: The West and Contemporary Warfare, 2002, p.29 
108  “British defence policy – rebuilding national consensus”, RUSI Journal, April 2007 
109  Jeremy Black, The Dotted Red Line: Britain’s Defence Policy in the Modern World, 2006, p.76-9 
110  Ibid, p.13-17 
111  “Afghan conflict support rises”, BBC News Online, 14 March 2008  
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However, this has served to emphasise the importance of securing legitimacy, making 
the case for war clearly, transparently, and honestly, and ensuring decisions are reached 
through appropriate legal processes and institutions. This might not inevitably imply UN 
approval, as the Kosovo crisis revealed, but instead, broad international approval or 
alternative ‘right authority’ invested in institutions such as NATO. This need to secure 
legitimacy is also evident in the Government’s current proposals to grant Parliament the 
general right to approve future deployments of British forces in situations of armed 
conflict.112 
 
Conversely while the public’s attitude to war may be less positive than before, public 
support for the armed forces has nevertheless generally remained consistently high. As 
DEMOS noted in its November 2007 study on the state of the British Armed Forces:  
 
The United Kingdom is rightly proud of its armed forces. The three services enjoy 
a high approval rating from the public. Eighty seven per cent of those surveyed 
for one polling company agreed that the British armed forces were ‘among the 
best in the world’ with 64 per cent having a ‘very favourable’ or ‘mainly 
favourable’ view of them.113  
 
However, on several occasions in the last year the Chief of the General Staff, General 
Sir Richard Dannatt has expressed concern over what he considers to be a “growing 
gulf” between the Armed Forces and the general public. In a speech to the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies in September 2007 he stated:  
 
I have become increasingly concerned about the growing gulf between the Army 
and the Nation. I am not talking about the support that we get from Her Majesty’s 
Government and to a large extent I am not talking about public finances. Rather, I 
am talking about how the Nation as a whole views the Army.  
 
The people who make up that Army are all volunteers and they fully understand 
that they join to fight and if necessary to put themselves in harms way to get the 
job done – we do not ask for sympathy when we are doing what we are paid to 
do. Now, a great deal has been made of the Military Covenant in recent weeks, 
mostly in terms of equipment and pay, but the real covenant is with the population 
at large – the Nation. The covenant says that we do what we do in your name; 
soldiers do not ask why; but they do ask for respect and honour for doing what 
they have been sent to do with courage and professionalism […] 
 
 
 
 
112  This initiative was first introduced by the Brown government in July 2007 as part of its wider set of 
measures on the Governance of Britain. Although it foresees a general right for Parliament to approve 
the future deployment of the Armed Forces, the government has reserved the right to exempt itself from 
the need to obtain Parliamentary approval in emergency situations. Further detail on these proposals is 
available in Library Standard Note SN/IA/4335, Parliamentary approval for deployment of the Armed 
Forces, November 2007. 
113  Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Out of Step: The case for change in the British Armed Forces, 
DEMOS, November 2007, p.11 
RESEARCH PAPER 08/58 
29 
As our operational commitments have become more intense, so has the need for 
support from the Nation. We must move from being a society that uses the 
military as a political football.114  
 
Concerns over the relationship between the military and society have also been reflected 
in the focus of recent Government policies towards the Armed Forces. In December 
2007 the Government announced that it had commissioned an independent study, to be 
led by Quentin Davies MP, into national recognition of the Armed Forces. Specifically, 
that review was intended to examine how a greater understanding and appreciation of 
the Armed Forces could be fostered among the general public.115 
 
Author and Chief Political Commentator for The Times, Peter Riddell, has refuted the 
suggestion of a “social gulf” however. In an article for RUSI Journal in February 2008 he 
commented: 
 
The claim by General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, that a 
large, and by implication, widening, gulf exists between the military and the public 
is a serious misreading of popular attitudes […] There is no shortage of media 
and public sympathy for the armed services at present. That is why Sir Richard 
Dannatt is wrong to talk of a gulf. It is certainly true that fewer members of the 
public have direct contact with the services than in the past […] but that does not 
mean any lack of support [,,,] Populus polls commissioned by the Army every 
quarter show a consistently high level of support for the forces, but also a large 
amount of ignorance about the organisation and functions of different parts of the 
services. Insofar as there is a gulf, it is of ignorance, not sympathy or support.116  
 
7. Civil- Military Relations 
In theoretical terms, strategy is the bridge that links military means and outcomes to 
political objectives.  Translating military force into political effect is a notoriously difficult 
business because the two are so different in nature. At the practical level this difficulty is 
further complicated by the division of labour between political and military professionals.  
Given the complexity and size associated with modern governments and militaries, 
individuals will generally only be able to focus on one profession and, moreover, will be 
dependent on a large institutional support structure. Thus there will normally exist a 
distinct divide between the civilian and military areas of government. Making strategy 
becomes a difficult task of reconciling the perspectives of these two divergent 
professional bodies.  As Colin Gray has noted: 
 
Between policymakers who must be competent domestic politicians and military 
commanders and advisers who must be successful soldiers, a systemic cultural 
inclination to miscommunicate is all but foreordained.117 
 
 
 
 
114  A copy of this speech given to the International Institute for Strategic Studies on 21 September 2007 is 
available at:  
 http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20070921AddressToThe
InternationalInstituteForStrategicStudies.htm 
115  This review is examined in greater detail in section II C of Library Research Paper RP08/57. 
116  Peter Riddell, “Armed Forces, Media and the Public”, RUSI Journal, February 2008, p.12-15 
117  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.63 
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It is axiomatic that, in liberal democratic states, the relationship will be one of military 
subordination to political masters. This is to a large extent derived from Clausewitz’s 
insistence that war is nothing but an instrument of policy. However, as Clausewitz also 
maintained, for it to function effectively the relationship should not be wholly one-sided. 
As Gray notes, “above all else, the professional military person must be viewed by 
politicians and military subordinates as a repository of sound military advice. Politicians 
and the country as a whole have a right to expect senior military professionals to speak 
military, and hence probably strategic, truth to political power”.118 The military might not 
determine policy, but where the military instrument is called upon, they must inform it.  
As Strachan makes clear, “Effective civil-military relations in practice rely on a dialogue.  
Policy is ill conceived if it asks the armed forces to do things which are not consistent 
with their capabilities”.119   
 
These theoretical points broadly reflect the ideal of civil-military relations in the UK.  
Nevertheless, in practice, the precise nature of the relationship is often dependent on 
specific circumstances, individual personalities, and the impact of events.  In the last ten 
years notable changes in the nature of civil-military relations have been witnessed within 
the British defence establishment, demonstrated, for example, by an increased 
willingness on the part of existing and/or retired senior military officials to speak publicly 
on issues relating to the governance of the Armed Forces.  
 
Since the Nott-Lewin reforms of 1982 the Chief of the Defence Staff was designed to be 
the government’s principal strategic advisor, but recent institutional developments – such 
as the expansion of the MOD and the creation of the Permanent Joint Headquarters– 
has meant that multiple centres of strategy have emerged and the space in which civilian 
and military professionals interact has become somewhat confused and unclear. The 
influence of the chiefs of staff is considered to have declined, with the military 
increasingly seen as simply accepting political direction, when ideally harmonisation not 
subordination should characterise the relationship.  As Strachan notes: 
 
In Britain…the apparent strengthening of service advice through the 
establishment of the Chief of the Defence Staff as the principal strategic advisor 
to the Minister of Defence has proved a false dawn.120   
 
As Richard Holmes has also observed:  
 
You can find a GP or surgeon, headmaster or primary teacher to give you an 
honest professional opinion about the state of the NHS or education on air.  Yet 
you cannot find a general who is able to speak with the same freedom while he 
serving.  The minute he has retired and can enter the fray he is written off by 
spin-doctors as yesterday’s man, a dear soldier, but no longer quite the thing.121 
 
 
 
 
118  Colin Gray, Modern Strategy, 1999, p.61 
119  Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq’, Survival, autumn 2006, p.67 
120  Hew Strachan, ‘Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq’, Survival, autumn 2006, p.77 
121  Richard Holmes, ‘Soldiers and Society’, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Annual Lecture, 10 May 
2006, p15. 
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However, as Anthony Forster has argued, the military itself is also partly to blame. He 
considers that their response to greater government control and influence has often been 
weak, ill-considered and counterproductive and that they have often been too slow to 
embrace change and have side-stepped or ignored challenges to their authority. Forster 
argues that senior commanders need to contribute more to public debates about the 
service, that they should more clearly articulate the military’s concerns in relation to 
requests from the political executive, and that they need to represent better the interests 
of the armed forces at senior levels of government.122 
 
Many of the current problems associated with civil-military relations have either been 
caused by, or come to the fore as a result of, the Iraq conflict. It has been argued by 
some commentators that the decision to intervene in Iraq was taken despite warnings 
from some senior military commanders over the military feasibility, and even legality of 
the war.  Reflecting the military concerns over the decision to invade Iraq, the Chief of 
Defence Staff approached the Attorney-General to ask for his opinion on the legality of 
the war; while in his memoirs, General Sir Mike Jackson, the then Chief of the General 
staff, describes how “notwithstanding the Attorney General’s advice that the war was 
legal” he “decided to do my homework”.123 As Hew Strachan has also noted:  
 
In the lead-up to the Iraq War Britain’s ministers were content simply to follow the 
lead of the United States, taking American ability to make strategy for granted, 
and not listening to the caveats of their own military advisors.124 
 
In an interview with the Daily Mail in October 2006 the Chief of the General staff, General 
Sir Richard Dannatt, reportedly suggested that the UK’s presence in Iraq was 
jeopardising British security interests around the world. As an article in the Guardian 
reported at the time:  
 
General Sir Richard Dannatt, the head of the army, dropped a political bombshell 
last night by saying that Britain must withdraw from Iraq "soon" or risk serious 
consequences for Iraqi and British society. In a blistering attack on Tony Blair's 
foreign policy, Gen Dannatt said the continuing military presence in Iraq was 
jeopardising British security and interests around the world. “I don't say that the 
difficulties we are experiencing round the world are caused by our presence in 
Iraq, but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them," […]  
 
Such an outspoken intervention by a British army chief is unprecedented in 
modern times and bound to increase pressure on the government to continue 
making its Iraq case against a backdrop of increasing mayhem on the ground.125 
 
An article in The Times also commented:  
 
Although other senior figures in the Army have privately expressed concern about 
strategy in Iraq and, in particular, the lack of proper planning after the invasion 
 
 
 
122  Anthony Forster, “Breaking to Covenant: Governance of the British Army in the Twenty First Century”, 
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had taken place in March 2003, no one as senior as Sir Richard has made such a 
personal attack on the Government’s strategy […]  
 
Traditionally, Service chiefs who oppose government policy would be expected to 
step down.126 
 
Yet strains in civil-military relations have not been confined to the operational sphere. In 
the last few years the level of criticism emerging from within military circles has risen in 
relation to issues such as defence spending, the quality of equipment issues to service 
personnel and the welfare and conditions of personnel and the support offered to their 
families and veterans. It is these latter issues which have led to accusations that the 
government is breaching its duty of care to personnel and undermining the principles of 
the Military Covenant.127 In the Daily Mail interview in October 2006 General Sir Richard 
Dannatt expressed concern over several aspects of the terms and conditions of service 
personnel including accommodation, pay and allowances and healthcare. Criticisms over 
the level of defence spending have also been aired publicly by a number of ex-service 
chiefs in a debate in the House of Lords in November 2007 in what has been considered 
an unprecedented attack on the Government’s defence policies.128 
 
As Gwyn Prins and Robert Salisbury noted in an article for the RUSI Journal in February 
2008:  
 
The security of the United Kingdom is at risk and under threat. The mismatch 
between the country’s military commitments and the funding of its defence moved 
Lords Bramall, Boyce, Craig, Guthrie and Inge – five former Chiefs of the 
Defence Staff – to take the unusual step of raising their concerns publicly in a 
House of Lords defence debate on 22 November 2007 […]  
 
The former Chiefs of the Defence Staff have stepped outside their traditional 
reticence to speak on behalf of all.129 
 
 
 
126  “Army chief called in to explain ‘quit Iraq’ appeal”, The Times, 13 October 2006  
127  These issues are examined in greater detail in Section II C of Library Research Paper RP08/57, British 
Defence Policy since 1997 
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II The Change to Resource Accounting 
To understand the issues and trends examined in Library Research Paper RP08/57, 
British defence policy since 1997, it is necessary to be clear about how the defence 
budget is set up and the relevant terms and definitions. Of fundamental importance is the 
change from cash accounting to Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) which 
occurred in 2002. The change to RAB has had a significant effect on the defence budget, 
in terms of inflating the MOD’s headline budget figures and affecting the time-series 
comparability of the data. 
 
A. Defence Budget Framework 
Until 1998/99, Government expenditure was accounted for on a cash basis, whereby 
revenues are recorded when cash was actually received and expenses were recorded 
when they were actually paid. In 1999/2000 and 2000/01 there was a transition across 
government to Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB): a form of accruals-basis 
accounting where costs are recorded when they are incurred, rather than when the cash 
is actually spent. During this time government departments continued to be controlled on 
a cash basis, but were required to produce consolidated resource accounts. The 2002 
Spending Review delivered the full introduction of RAB. This change from cash 
accounting to RAB has had a significant effect on the defence budget, in terms of 
inflating the MOD’s headline budget and affecting the time-series comparability of the 
data. These issues are discussed in more detail below.130 
 
Departmental budgets are comprised of Departmental Expenditure Limits (a 
department’s main budget) and Annually Managed Expenditure. Departmental 
Expenditure Limits (DEL) are firm plans for three years for a specific part of a 
department’s expenditure (as set out in Government Spending Reviews). These are split 
into Resource DEL (operating costs defined by resource consumption) and Capital DEL 
(new investment by the department). Departments may carry forward unspent DEL from 
one year to the next, but it may be increased only in exceptional circumstances with the 
Treasury’s agreement through a claim on the DEL reserve. In general DEL will cover all 
running costs and all programmed expenditure. The move to RAB requires that DEL now 
also include relevant non-cash costs, which are explained in more detail below. 
 
Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) relates to expenditure outside the DEL but 
included in Departmental Budgets. A programme is included in AME if it cannot 
reasonably be subject to firm three-year limits as for DEL. Defence budget AME includes 
programmes that are demand-led, such as War Pensions, and exceptionally volatile 
items that cannot be controlled by the Department, such as the financial provision for 
programmes related to the nuclear deterrent.  
 
 
 
 
130  For a more comprehensive guide to this issue please see Annex B in 2002 Spending Review, New 
Public Spending Plans 2003-2006, Cm 5570. 
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1. Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) 
The Government’s introduction of resource accounting and budgeting was the most 
significant overhaul of the public finances for well over a century. In its 2002 Spending 
Review, the Government outlined the reasons behind the move to RAB, arguing that the 
previous cash system: 
 
failed to provide the right information and incentives, and in particular, contributed 
to a bias against essential long term investment ... Resource accounting applies 
the best financial reporting and disclosure practices of commercial accounting to 
central Government finance, and resource budgeting uses this as the basis for 
planning and controlling spending.131 
 
Resource accounting provides a better measure of the costs of running services, since it 
captures the full economic costs of providing services. Costs are recorded when 
resources are consumed (or accrued) rather than when the cash is spent. In addition, 
resource budgeting captures non-cash costs of economic consumption such as: 
 
• depreciation – the consumption of capital assets over their useful economic life; 
 
• a cost of capital charge – the opportunity and financing costs of holding capital; 
 
• provisions for future payments – for example compensation or early retirement 
liabilities. 
 
RAB therefore provides better, more transparent information on the use of Government 
resources and departments’ activities, assets and liabilities.   
 
The inclusion of new non-cash costs in the departments’ main budgets (DEL) is a 
significant change to the public spending control framework. The first of the main 
changes is that the main budget for current expenditure (the resource DEL) now includes 
charges for depreciation and impairments (using up or writing off capital assets), a cost-
of-capital charge and provisions for future costs.  
 
In addition, grants paid to the private sector are now managed through the resource 
rather than the capital budget. This reflects the fact that under RAB, spending is treated 
only as capital if it creates an asset on the government’s balance sheet. Finally, so as to 
reflect the more commercial budgeting system for public corporations under RAB, 
investment by public corporations financed by their own resources no longer counts as 
part of the department’s capital DEL. 
 
In the past, it has been the practice to add resource and capital DELs together to give a 
single number for spending on a department. The inclusion of capital consumption costs 
(depreciation and impairments) in the resource DEL means that simply adding the 
resource and capital DELs together would be misleading. Capital would be counted twice 
 
 
 
131  HM Treasury: Opportunity and security for all: investing in an enterprising, fairer Britain. New Public 
spending plans 2003-06 (Spending Review 2002), Cm 5570, Session 2001-02 
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– once when the new investment was made and again as it is depreciated over its useful 
life. 
 
In order to provide a single number for departmental spending, total DEL is presented 
net of the capital consumption costs. This measure of total annual spending under 
resource budgeting reflects the resources used to run public services plus the net 
investment in them. 
 
 
2. Implications for Defence Expenditure 
The move to RAB has had a large effect on defence expenditure. Because of the 
significant fixed capital base under the control of the Ministry of Defence (approximately 
one third of total central government assets), the Department incurs significant charges 
for holding and using capital. This means that the resources consumed by defence are 
higher than when measured under cash or near-cash budgeting: 
 
In general under resource budgeting, resource DELs are usually larger than 
under the old near cash system. Capital DELs are sometimes lower because 
some grant funded public investment is treated as resource rather than capital.132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132  HM Treasury, Opportunity and security for all: investing in an enterprising, fairer Britain. New Public 
spending plans 2003-06 (Spending Review 2002), Cm 5570, Session 2001-02 
Departmental Budgets 
 
- Direct Resource DEL: This is a control aggregate within the resource budget. It excludes 
the non-cash items such as depreciation, cost of capital and movement in provisions. Direct 
Resource DEL is also known as ‘near cash in the resource budget’. 
 
- Indirect Resource DEL: This covers items such as depreciation, cost of capital charges, 
movement in provisions, and the notional auditors’ fees for the National Audit Office (NAO). 
This is also known as non-cash. 
 
- Total Resource DEL is the sum of the direct and indirect resource DEL. 
 
- Capital DEL: This is for new investment by the department, including Capital additions, 
disposals, and the capital repayment of loans.  
 
- Total DEL is the sum of Resource DEL and Capital DEL less depreciation in DEL. 
 
- Total AME is the sum of Resource AME and Capital AME less depreciation in AME.  
 
- Total departmental spending is the sum of the resource and capital budgets (DEL + AME) 
less depreciation. 
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The table below shows the effect that the adjustments for resource budgeting have had 
on the MOD’s Departmental Expenditure Limit.  
 
DEL (previous basis)
Adjustments for full 
resource budgeting DEL (new basis)
2001/02 prov 24.5 5.5 30.0
2002/03 plans 24.2 5.1 29.3
2003/04 CSR plans 25.6 5.3 30.9
2004/05 CSR plans 26.5 5.3 31.8
2005/06 CSR plans 27.4 5.4 32.8
Source: 2002 Spending Review, Cm 5570
DEL - adjustments for resource budgeting, £ billion
 
 
It is clear that the switch to RAB increases MOD DELs by more than £5bn in each year.  
 
Furthermore, the move to RAB has affected the time-series comparability of the 
expenditure data, with figures for DEL from 2001-02 onwards not directly comparable 
with earlier data. In order to facilitate comparison with earlier spending plans, a ‘near 
cash’ figure for defence spending that is consistent with the previous budgeting basis will 
continue to be produced each year. This is the total accrued expenditure spend and is 
equal to the sum of Direct Resource DEL (which does not include non-cash items such 
as depreciation and the cost of capital charge) and Capital DEL, in addition to near cash 
AME in the resource and capital budgets. 
 
3. Request for Resources 
The defence budget is split between three Requests for Resources (RfRs): 
 
RfR1 – Provision of Defence Capability: 
This provides for expenditure primarily to meet the MOD’s operational support and 
logistics services costs and the costs of providing the equipment capability required by 
defence policy. 
 
RfR2 – Conflict Prevention: 
This provides primarily for the additional costs of operations. These are the net additional 
costs incurred: the costs that the Department would have incurred regardless of the 
operation taking place, such as wages and salaries, are recorded against RfR1. 
 
RFR3 – War Pensions and Allowances: 
This provides primarily for pensions and other payments/allowances for disablement or 
death arising out of war or service in the Armed Forces after 2 September 1939; awards 
to surviving members of British groups held prisoner by the Japanese during the Second 
World War (Far Eastern Prisoners of War) or their surviving spouse and pensions and 
other payments in respect of service in the Armed Forces at other times.  
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The following table gives figures for departmental spending by activity in resource terms 
between 2001-02 and 2007-08.133 It is not possible to compare these figures with earlier 
periods due to the implementation of RAB. 
 
Departmental spending by activity (resource basis)
£000
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
outturn outturn outturn outturn outturn outturn plans
Total departmental spending1 35,348,168 35,451,386 35,884,242 37,448,230 38,576,899 39,303,013 39,713,191
of which:  
Provision of Defence Capability (RfR1) 30,315,772 29,532,298 29,792,914 31,932,386 31,926,666 32,221,623 33,546,243
Conflict Prevention Costs (RfR2) 586,085 1,436,119 1,493,430 1,112,023 1,267,093 1,757,702 44,303
War Pensions & Allowances (RfR3) 1,237,535 1,165,411 1,116,047 1,109,521 1,068,595 1,039,950 1,027,007
Armed Forces Pay & Pensions (AFPS RfR1) 3,208,776 3,317,558 3,481,851 3,294,300 4,314,545 4,283,738 5,095,638
Notes:
1. Total departmental spending is the sum of the resource and capital budgets (DEL + AME) less depreciation
Source: The Government's Expenditure Plans 2007-08, Cm 7098
   
By far the largest proportion of the resources requested (over 80%) falls within the 
provision of defence capability (RfR1), which covers personnel, equipment and support 
costs for the Armed Forces. 
 
While RfR2 for peacekeeping operations, including in Africa, are set out in the 
Department’s Main Estimates, the additional cost of the UK’s main military operations in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans are not requested until the Supplementary 
Estimates.134 These costs are covered by Treasury reserve funds and not from the 
defence main budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
133  A detailed breakdown by consumption of resources and capital spending by Top-Level Budget (TLB) is 
given in the statistical digest in section III.  
134  It is through a Department’s Supply Estimates that government seeks Parliament’s authority for its 
spending plans. A Department’s Main Estimates start the supply procedure and are presented around 
the start of the financial year to which they relate. These are then followed by two Supplementary 
Estimates over the course of the financial year, which provide updates to a Department’s cost forecasts 
and, where necessary, seek additional provision of funds. These are the Winter Supplementary Estimate 
and Spring Supplementary Estimate. 
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III Statistical Digest  
The following statistical information supports the issues which are examined in the main 
Library Research Paper RP08/57, British defence policy since 1997 and where possible 
cover the period 1997-2008.  
 
 
A. Finance  
 
Breakdown of top level budgets  
 
a) Resource budget  
 
 
Table 1. Resource Budget DEL and AME
£000
Consumption of resource by activity 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
outturn outturn outturn outturn outturn estimate plans plans plans
Resource DEL
Provision of Defence Capability 35,344,649 30,143,079 30,377,555 32,406,129 32,042,452 33,547,935 33,533,755 35,171,403 36,708,947
Commander-in-Chief Fleet 1 4,416,927 3,037,456 3,325,192 3,304,503 1,772,195 1,826,418 2,171,671 1,900,859 2,003,914
2nd Sea lord / Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command 1 624,107 592,796 684,288 667,076 - - - - -
Commander-in-Chief land Command 4,637,378 4,461,680 4,576,406 4,872,589 3,535,208 4,678,851 6,471,712 6,120,296 6,389,824
Adjutant General (Personnel and Training Command) 1,512,891 1,524,720 1,528,481 1,706,155 1,599,955 869,454 - - -
General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) 2 617,349 568,242 531,495 498,011 298,752 - - - -
Commander-in-Chief Strike Command 4,303,082 3,133,449 3,182,837 3,735,269 1,633,171 2,241,513 2,734,478 2,463,240 2,353,063
Commander-in-Chief Personnel and Training Command 925,480 861,609 973,155 770,291 622,361 - - - -
Chief of Joint Operations 454,912 466,687 491,960 509,331 332,285 395,633 437,394 376,544 389,778
Central 4,359,261 4,663,999 5,563,982 5,134,022 4,173,133 4,446,307 4,057,955 4,653,441 4,391,707
Defence Estates - - - 1,127,929 2,666,816 2,554,016 2,324,362 2,686,032 2,931,787
Defence Equipment & Support Agency 3 - - - - - 15,993,474 14,712,464 16,295,569 17,609,315
Defence Procurement Agency 3 2,807,275 2,848,906 2,542,345 2,266,978 2,302,796 - - - -
Chief of Defence logistics 3 10,261,169 7,565,041 6,470,145 7,315,114 12,584,338 - - - -
Science Innovation Technology 424,818 418,494 507,269 498,861 521,442 542,269 621,427 675,422 639,559
Peacekeeping and Operations 1,117,429 1,233,155 938,181 1,055,848 1,448,420 2,157,946 89,566 - -
Total Resource Budget DEL 36,462,078 31,376,234 31,315,736 33,461,977 33,490,872 35,705,881 33,623,321 35,171,403 36,708,947
Resource AME
Provision of Defence Capability 1,668,011 200,052 55,883 -202,568 -518,452 204,405 -130,217 -146,505 -143,588
Commander-in-Chief Fleet -8,771 -1,516 1,110 35,727 - - - - -
General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) -427 - - - - - - - -
Chief of Joint Operations - 5,106 -3,147 - 9,200 - - - -
Central 79,220 20,178 1,164 -2,175 231 -14 -12 -12 -12
Defence Estates - - - - - 36,337 - - -
Defence Equipment & Support Agency 3 - - - - - 16,162,082 -130,205 -146,493 -143,576
Defence Procurement Agency 3 1,463,014 175,435 33,694 -239,733 -566,367 - - - -
Chief of Defence logistics 3 134,975 849 23,062 3,613 38,484 - - - -
Armed Forces Pay and Pensions 3,317,558 3,481,851 3,302,397 4,314,545 4,398,961 5,580,928 5,869,365 6,237,852 6,654,387
War Pensions and Allowances, etc. 1,165,411 1,116,047 1,109,521 1,068,595 1,038,073 1,014,126 1,015,090 911,815 964,403
Total Resource Budget AME 6,150,980 4,797,950 4,467,801 5,180,572 4,918,582 6,799,459 6,754,238 7,003,162 7,475,202
Total Resource Budget 42,613,058 36,174,184 35,783,537 38,642,549 38,409,454 42,505,340 40,377,559 42,174,565 44,184,149
Notes:
1. In 2006/07 the two Royal Navy TLBs, Commander in Chief Fleet and 2nd Sea Lord were combined into a single TLB called 'Fleet'. 
2. From 2007/08 the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland TLB and elements of the Adjutant General's TLB have been included in Land TLB. 
3. From 2007/08 the Defence Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation have been merged to form Defence Equipment and Support. 
Source: Defence Plan including the Government's Expenditure Plan 2008-2012, Cm 7385, MoD  
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b) Capital budget  
 
 
 
Table 2. Capital Budget DEL and AME
£000
Capital spending by activity 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11
outturn outturn outturn outturn outturn estimate plans plans plans
Capital DEL
Provision of Defence Capability 5,795,992 5,741,250 6,526,781 6,198,939 6,721,565 6,938,680 7,870,896 8,186,928 8,870,854
Commander-in-Chief Fleet 1 15,941 37,391 17,000 24,136 13 ,893 -567 25,111 94,353 55,430
2nd Sea lord / Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command 1 15,749 28,390 23,000 10,978 - - - - -
Commander-in-Chief land Command 30,132 185,673 153,000 60,489 75,441 120,311 261,758 385,116 324,264
AdjutantGeneral (Personnel and Training Command) 24,820 28,996 22,345 18,081 15,684 -18,353 - - -
General Officer Commanding (Northern Ireland) 2 108,208 43,329 28,000 5,585 2,371 - - - -
Commandercin-Chief Strike Command 68,544 40,367 28,000 18,420 7,083 1,500 111,675 128,992 139,106
Commander-in-Chief Personnel and Training Command 14,973 18,123 24,000 13,538 10,865 - - - -
Chief of Joint Operations 28,429 27,643 25,967 18,609 4,322 34,095 68,258 116,786 43,524
Central -101,450 -164,939 281,774 '368,056 48,012 42,303 74,973 99,121 106,532
Defence Estates - - - 125,822 90,777 50,126 18,366 -126,079 -183,237
Defence Equipment & Support Agency 3 - - - - - 6,708,906 7,310,755 7,488,639 8,385,235
Defence Procurement Agency 3 4,381,242 4,295,538 4,614,557 5,252,492 5,283,045 - - - -
Chief of Defence logistics 3 1,209,404 1,200,739 1,309,138 1,018,845 1,169,954 - - - -
Science Innovation Technology - - - - 118 359 - - -
Peace-Keeping and Operations 318,690 260,275 173,842 211,243 348,198 836,358 - - -
Total Capital Budget DEL 6,114,682 6,001,525 6,700,623 6,410,182 7,069,763 7,775,038 7,870,896 8,186,928 8,870,854
Capital AME
Provision of Defence Capability -49,900 -4,214 - - 12,843 -709,000 - - -
Central -49,900 -4,214
Defence Estates -709,000
Defence Procurement Agency 12,843
Total Capital Budget AME -49,900 -4,214 - - 12,843 -709,000 - - -
Total Capital Budget 6,064,782 5,997,311 6,700,623 6,410,182 7,082,606 7,066,038 7,870,896 8,186,928 8,870,854
Notes:
1. In 2006/07 the two Royal Navy TLBs, Commander in Chief Fleet and 2nd Sea Lord were combined into a single TLB called 'Fleet'. 
2. From 2007/08 the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland TLB and elements of the Adjutant General's TLB have been included in Land TLB. 
3. From 2007/08 the Defence Procurement Agency and Defence Logistics Organisation have been merged to form Defence Equipment and Support. 
Source: Defence Plan including the Government's Expenditure Plan 2008-2012, Cm 7385, MoD  
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Defence spending since 1955  
 
Table 3. Defence expenditure (a) : 1955/56 to 2006/07 
£ billion £ billion £bn change % change As per
at 2006/2007 over previous over previous cent of
prices (b) year in real year in real GDP
terms terms
1955/56 1.4 26.9 7.1%
1956/57 1.5 27.6 0.7 2.5% 7.2%
1957/58 1.4 24.7 -2.8 -10.3% 6.4%
1958/59 1.5 24.7 0.0 -0.1% 6.3%
1959/60 1.5 24.6 -0.1 -0.4% 5.9%
1960/61 1.6 26.0 1.4 5.9% 6.1%
1961/62 1.7 26.8 0.7 2.8% 6.1%
1962/63 1.8 27.1 0.3 1.3% 6.1%
1963/64 1.8 27.1 0.0 -0.2% 5.8%
1964/65 1.9 27.5 0.5 1.8% 5.6%
1965/66 2.1 28.3 0.7 2.7% 5.7%
1966/67 2.1 27.9 -0.4 -1.3% 5.5%
1967/68 2.3 28.9 1.0 3.6% 5.5%
1968/69 2.2 27.3 -1.6 -5.5% 5.0%
1969/70 2.2 25.6 -1.7 -6.3% 4.6%
1970/71 2.5 26.6 1.0 3.8% 4.7%
1971/72 2.8 27.5 0.9 3.5% 4.7%
1972/73 2.9 26.2 -1.3 -4.9% 4.3%
1973/74 3.1 26.5 0.4 1.5% 4.2%
1974/75 4.2 30.1 3.5 13.3% 4.7%
1975/76 5.3 30.2 0.1 0.4% 4.8%
1976/77 6.2 30.6 0.5 1.5% 4.7%
1977/78 6.8 29.7 -0.9 -3.0% 4.5%
1978/79 7.5 29.4 -0.3 -1.1% 4.3%
1979/80 9.2 30.9 1.6 5.3% 4.4%
1980/81 11.2 31.9 1.0 3.1% 4.7%
1981/82 12.6 32.8 0.9 2.9% 4.9%
1982/83 14.4 35.0 2.2 6.7% 5.1%
1983/84 15.5 36.0 0.9 2.7% 5.0%
1984/85 17.1 37.8 1.8 5.0% 5.2%
1985/86 17.9 37.6 -0.2 -0.6% 4.9%
1986/87 18.2 36.8 -0.7 -2.0% 4.6%
1987/88 18.9 36.2 -0.6 -1.7% 4.3%
1988/89 19.1 34.2 -2.0 -5.5% 3.9%
1989/90 20.8 34.8 0.5 1.5% 3.9%
1990/91 22.3 34.6 -0.1 -0.4% 3.9%
1991/92 24.6 35.9 1.3 3.8% 4.1%
1992/93 23.8 33.7 -2.3 -6.3% 3.8%
1993/94 23.4 32.4 -1.3 -3.9% 3.6%
1994/95 22.5 30.6 -1.7 -5.3% 3.2%
1995/96 21.5 28.4 -2.2 -7.3% 2.9%
1996/97 22.0 28.2 -0.3 -0.9% 2.8%
1997/98 20.9 26.0 -2.2 -7.7% 2.5%
1998/99 22.5 27.2 1.2 4.7% 2.6%
1999/00 22.6 26.8 -0.4 -1.6% 2.4%
2000/01 23.6 27.6 0.8 2.9% 2.4%
2001/02 26.1 29.8 2.3 8.2% 2.6%
2002/03 27.3 30.3 0.5 1.6% 2.6%
2003/04 29.3 31.6 1.3 4.3% 2.6%
2004/05 29.5 30.9 -0.7 -2.1% 2.5%
2005/06 30.6 31.4 0.5 1.6% 2.5%
2006/07 31.5 31.5 0.0 0.0% 2.4%
Notes:
(b) Adjusted using the adjusted GDP deflator as at October 2007
Sources: British Historical Statistics, Mitchell - Up to and including 1974/75
UK Defence Statistics, DASA (provided by DASA official) - From 1975/76
MOD Annual Report and Accounts
Public Expenditure: Statistical Analyses 2004, Cm 6201
(a) Figures show the department's net cash requirement. This series allows for 
comparisons between pre and post RAB implementation
(c) Total Managed Expenditure: Sum of total current and capital expenditure of 
the public sector
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B. Personnel  
Strengths and requirements of each Service  
 
Table 4. Strengths and requirements of UK Armed Forces1: at 1 April
Thousands
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Naval Service
Trained requirement 42.9 41.9 40.9 39.9 39.9 39.2 38.5 38.7 38.2 36.8 36.8 36.3
Trained strength 41.7 40.4 39.1 38.9 38.5 37.5 37.6 37.5 36.3 35.5 34.9 35.1
Variation -1.2 -1.5 -1.9 -1.0 -1.4 -1.7 -0.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -1.2
Untrained strength 3.5 4.1 4.6 4.31 4.4 4.9 5.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.0
Total UK regular forces 45.1 44.5 43.7 43.2 42.9 42.4 42.6 42.0 40.8 40.0 39.4 39.1
Army
Trained requirement 106.4 105.8 105.3 106.4 107.0 107.0 107.0 106.7 104.2 101.8 101.8 101.8
Trained strength 101.5 101.1 99.7 100.3 100.4 100.9 102.1 103.8 102.4 100.6 99.4 98.3
Variation -4.8 -4.7 -5.6 -6.1 -6.6 -6.1 -4.9 -3.0 -1.7 -1.2 -2.4 -3.5
Untrained strength 11.2 12.4 13.7 13.9 13.6 13.9 14.9 13.7 11.0 10.9 11.2 11.5
Total UK regular forces 113 113.5 113.3 114.2 114.0 114.8 117.0 117.4 113.4 111.4 110.5 109.8
Royal Air Force
Trained requirement 56.4 54.5 53.0 52.2 51.6 50.0 49.6 49.9 48.7 47.3 45.0 41.2
Trained strength 54.2 52.7 51.8 51.2 50.1 49.2 48.9 49.1 49.2 46.9 43.6 40.6
Variation -2.2 -1.8 -1.3 -1.0 -1.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 +0.5 -0.4 -1.4 -0.6
Untrained strength 2.7 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.7 4.7 3.0 2.3 2.2 3.1
Total UK regular forces 56.9 55.9 55.2 54.9 54.0 53.3 53.6 53.8 52.2 47.7 45.7 43.8
Notes:
1. Full time personnel, including UK regulars, FTRS and Gurkhas
Source: DASA Statistical Bulletin TSP3  
 
 
Manning balance 
 
Table 5. Manning balance 1, 2
Requirement Strength % Requirement Strength % Requirement Strength %
1998 41,940 40,480 -3.5% 105,770 100,890 -4.6% 54,530 52,670 -3.4%
1999 40,950 39,330 -4.0% 105,270 99,900 -5.1% 53,030 51,910 -2.1%
2000 39,860 38,880 -2.5% 106,400 100,340 -5.7% 51,900 51,210 -1.3%
2001 39,900 38,540 -3.4% 106,970 100,420 -6.1% 51,600 50,100 -2.9%
2002 39,180 37,500 -4.3% 106,970 100,410 -6.1% 49,990 49,200 -1.6%
2003 38,500 37,620 -2.3% 106,980 102,000 -4.7% 49,640 48,890 -1.5%
2004 38,720 37,510 -3.1% 106,730 103,550 -3.0% 49,890 49,120 -1.5%
2005 38,190 36,400 -4.7% 104,180 102,440 -1.7% 48,730 49,210 1.0%
2006 36,830 35,620 -3.3% 101,800 100,620 -1.2% 47,290 46,940 -0.7%
2007 36,800 34,920 -5.1% 101,800 99,350 -2.4% 45,020 43,550 -3.3%
2008 36,260 35,070 -3.3% 101,800 98,270 -3.5% 41,210 40,620 -1.4%
Notes:
2. As at April 01 each year
3. Including Royal Marines
Source: DASA
Navy 3 Army RAF
1. Manning balance is defined as between -2% and +1% of the trained strength requirement, and is measured against the requirement prevailing at the 
time. Since that requirement is dynamic, the underlying baseline numerical target varies over the period.
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Chart 1. Manning Balance 1998-2008
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Intake/outflow  
 
Table 6. UK Regular Armed Forces Manpower Flows, 12 months to 1st April 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Intake from civilian life
Naval Service 4,600      4,770      4,950      4,620      5,010      5,220      4,120      3,690      3,940      3,770      3,860      
Army 15,380    16,990    16,500    14,770    14,930    16,690    15,260    11,720    12,730    14,300    14,520    
Royal Air Force 3,530      4,250      4,100      3,630      3,780      4,450      4,160      2,180      1,480      1,720      2,930      
Total Regular Forces 23,510    26,000    25,550    23,020    23,720    26,350    23,540    17,590    18,150    19,790    21,310    
Outflow from UK Regular Forces
Naval Service 5,270      5,530      5,800      5,040      5,800      5,290      4,770      4,630      4,490      4,310      4,330      
Army 14,380    17,040    16,170    15,210    14,380    14,560    14,600    15,070    14,190    15,770    15,320    
Royal Air Force 4,610      4,890      4,620      4,680      4,530      4,250      4,040      3,730      4,590      5,070      5,020      
Total Regular Forces 24,260    27,460    26,580    24,930    24,710    24,100    23,400    23,430    23,260    25,140    24,670    
Notes: 
Sources: DASA Statistical Bulletin TSP 1
Figures are for UK regular Forces (including both trained and untrained personnel), and therefore exclude Gurkhas, Full Time reserve Service personnel, the Home 
Service battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment, mobilised reservists and Naval Activated Reser
All figures are rounded to the nearest 10. Due to the rounding methods used totals may not always equal the sum of the parts.
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Reserves  
 
Table 7. UK Reserves & Auxiliary Forces 1, as at 1 April
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Regular Reserve 259,500 254,900 247,600 241,600 234,900 224,900 212,600 201,400 191,500 n/a n/a
Volunteer Reserve 62,500 63,000 57,800 51,500 47,600 46,600 45,300 43,700 44,100 n/a n/a
of which:
Naval Service 27,700 28,500 28,500 28,300 27,600 27,600 27,300 27,000 30,900 n/a n/a
Royal Fleet Reserve 10,000 10,600 10,600 10,100 9,800 10,200 10,300 10,700 10,500 n/a n/a
Individuals liable to recall 14,100 14,200 14,100 14,000 13,800 13,400 12,800 12,000 11,600 n/a n/a
Total regular reserves 24,100 24,800 24,700 24,200 23,500 23,500 23,200 23,200 26,500 n/a n/a
Volunteer Reserves & Auxiliary Forces 2 3,600 3,700 3,800 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 3,800 4,400 n/a n/a
Army 247,700 243,800 232,800 221,100 211,380 202,000 191,110 179,940 171,450 166,050 158,610
Army reserve 41,200 36,800 34,900 34,500 33,630 33,400 32,400 31,090 31,420 32,060 33,760
Individuals liable to recall 148,900 149,300 145,600 141,000 136,030 127,700 119,100 110,720 102,770 95,520 88,060
Total regular reserves 190,100 186,200 180,500 175,500 169,670 161,100 151,500 141,900 134,190 127,590 121,820
Volunteer Reserves (inc Territorial Army) 3 57,600 57,600 52,300 45,600 41,720 40,900 39,610 38,120 37,260 38,460 36,790
Royal Air Force 47,425 46,390 45,020 44,640 44,000 42,890 40,480 38,890 37,290 36,670 35,550
Royal Air Force Reserve 16,300 15,400 14,700 14,300 13,930 12,700 10,400 9,310 8,230 7,790 7,350
Individuals liable to recall 29,000 28,500 27,700 27,600 27,580 27,600 27,500 27,120 26,720 26,570 26,030
Total regular reserves 45,400 43,900 42,400 41,900 41,600 40,300 37,900 36,600 35,200 34,360 33,380
Volunteer Reserves & Auxiliary Forces 2,025 2,490 2,620 2,740 2,480 2,590 2,580 2,460 2,450 2,300 2,160
Notes:
1. A new Reserve Forces Act came into force on 1st April 1997. The figures in this table have been re-aggregated to follow the new conventions set out in the Act
2. The Royal Naval Auxiliary Service are not included in this table.  They were disbanded on 31 March 1994.
3. The figures for the TA include Non-Regular Permanent Staff of which there were around 1,400 at 1 April 2000.
Source: DASA Statistical Bulletin TSP 07
4. Due to ongoing validation of data from a new Personnel Administration System, 2007 data for Army are as at 1 March 2007, for the Naval Service Regular Reserve data are currently unavailable and for the 
RAF data are provisional and subject to review.
 
 
 
C. Assets   
 
Army 
 
 
Table 8. Army Equipment, by type
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Main Battle Tanks 541 545 542 616 636 594 543 543 543 386 386 386
Reconnaissance 453 462 462 481 467 475 475 475 475 475 475 475
Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle 998 586 539 538 575 575 575 575 575 575 575 575
Armoured Personnel Carrier 2,078 1,881 1,929 1,888 2,398 2,363 2,503 2,503 2,503 2,611 2,611 2,718
Artillery 461 549 425 457 475 457 407 407 877 877 877 877
Aircraft Reconnaissance 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 4
Helicopters 270 281 281 254 258 270 274 274 274 324 324 299
UAV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8 8 8 8 8 8 192
Source: The Military Balance (various years)  
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Royal Air Force (RAF) 
 
 
Table 9. Aircraft fleets by type of aircraft for the Royal Air Force Air Command including Operational Conversion Units and Training Aircraft
As at 01 April, FAF 1
Aircraft Role Aircraft type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Air - Combat Tornado GR 128 128 110 110 110 110 110 110 101 106 106
Jaguar 
GR1/A/3/3A 40 40 38 38 38 38 38 38 32 13 13 2
Jaguar T2A/T4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 3 -
Harrier GR3/5/7 51 51 48 45 3 - - - - - - -
Harrier T4/10/12 9 8 8 8 3 - - - - - - -
Tornado F3 104 104 89 90 90 90 90 90 83 4 72 59
Typhoon - - - - - - - - - 25 32
C4 and ISTAR Nimrod R1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Canberra PR9 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 - 5
Canberra T4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - - 5
Sentry AEW 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Maritime Nimrod MR2 24 24 23 22 20 20 20 20 14 6 14 14
Air Support VC10 C1K 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
VC10 K3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
VC10 K4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 2 2 2
Sea King 
HAR3/3A 7 19 19 19 19 19 19 21 21 23 23 23
Tristar K1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tristar KC1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Tristar C2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Hawk (100 Sqn) - - - - - - - - 16 8 16 14
Logistics BAe 125 CC3 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
BAe 146 CC2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
C-17 - - - - 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Hercules 
C1/C3/C4/C5 50 50 50 50 50 50 51 51 50 50 44
Support Helicopters Chinook 27 27 31 - 9 - - - - - - -
Puma 33 33 33 - 9 - - - - - - -
Wessex 17 11 10 - 9 - - - - - - -
Training Aircraft
Elementary Training 10 Viking 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 87 72 72 82
Vigilant 53 53 53 53 53 55 61 61 61 61 63
Basic Training 10 Tucano 66 73 78 75 74 76 73 73 44 11 44 52
Jetstream T1 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 11 - -
Dominie T1 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 7 9 9 8
Advanced Training 10 Hawk 
T1/T1A/T1W 62 67 71 68 68 69 72 65 61 8 61 55
RAF Aerobatic Team 
(Red Arrows) Hawk T1/T1A 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 13 13 13
12. Merlin replaced Wessex in 2002
Source: UKDS, Tables 3.9 and 3.10, DASA (various years)
4.Tornado F3 are reducing and due to be disbanded.
5.Canberra was declared non-operational with effect from July 2006.
6.The Nimrod MR2 are to be replaced by the Nimrod MRA4.
11.Reduction in Tucano ROF reflects maturing Resources and Management programmes.
7.Excludes two Sea King aircraft attached to 78 Sqn (based in the Falkland Islands).
8.Prior to 2005, 100 Sqn were included under Personnel and Training Command.
9.Support helicopters were transferred to the Joint Helicopter Command on 1 October 1999. 
10.Air Command also use Beechking Air 200, Tutor, Firefly, Squirrel and Griffin aircraft owned by a private contractor in training roles.
Notes:
1.Forward Available Fleet is defined as the number of aircraft required to undertake the mandated task; including aircrew and ground crew training, 'in-work' rectification and operational / tactical trials.
2.Jaguar GR1A/3/3A were declared non-operational with effect from 30 April 07.
3.Harrier aircraft were transferred to the Joint Force Harrier on 1 April 2000.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPER 08/58 
45 
 
Royal Navy 
 
Table 10. Number of active vessels in the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxilary
As at 01 April each year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Royal Navy submarines
Trident / Polaris 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Fleet 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 10 9
Royal Navy ships
Aircraft Carriers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
Landing Platform Docks / Helicopter 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 3 3 3
Destroyers 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 9 8 8
Frigates 23 23 23 21 21 21 20 20 19 17 17
Mine countermeasures vessels 19 19 20 21 23 22 22 19 16 16 16
Patrol ships and craft 34 28 24 23 23 23 22 26 26 22 22
Support ships 1 - - - - - - - - - -
Survey ships 6 5 5 6 6 3 3 5 5 5 5
Ice patrol ships 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service
Tankers 1 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 11 10 10
Fleet replenishment ships 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 2 2 2
Aviation training ship 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Landing ships 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 4
Forward repair ships 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Roll-on Roll-off vessels - - - 2 2 2 7 6 6 6 6
Notes:
Source: UKDS, Table 3.1, DASA
1.Four Fleet replacement ships were re-categorised as Tankers between 01 April 2004 and 01 April 2005 to reflect their primary role.
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Joint Forces Command/Joint Helicopter Command   
 
 
Table 11. Joint Helicopter Command and Joint Force Harrier
Joint Helicopter 
Command Aircraft type 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Royal Navy 
Helicopters Sea King HC4 2 33 33 33 33 33 29 26
Sea King HC63 - - - - - - 3
Lynx AH7 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Gazelle 4 9 9 8 8 - - -
Army Aviation 
Helicopters Lynx 119 117 116 116 98 5 74 68
Gazelle 122 117 113 113 91 5 57 45
Apache .. .. .. .. .. 5 38 42
Islander 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5
Defender 40006 - - - - 3 5 3 3
RAF Helicopters Chinook HC2 31 31 31 31 31 27 27
Puma HC1 37 37 37 37 37 26 24
Merlin Mk 3 - - 18 7 18 18 15 15
Wessex HC1 8 8 - 7 - - - -
Joint Force 
Harrier
Royal Navy Aircraft Sea Harrier FA22 26 26 26 17 8 - 8 -
Harrier T4 / T8 4 4 4 4 2 - 8 -
RAF Aircraft 
(including OCUs9 ) Harrier GR 45 48 48 48 45 45 45
Harrier T10 / T12 8 9 8 8 7 7 7
Notes:
Source: UK Defence Statistics 2007, DASA
7.Merlin replaced Wessex in 2002.
8.The Sea Harrier and Harrier T8 were docommisioned prior to 1 April 2006
9.Operational Conversion Units train qualified aircrew for different aircraft types. The RAF no longer identifies ROFs for OCUs separately from front line 
aircraft.
3.Sea King HC 6 introduced since 1 April 2006 to replace Sea King HC4 undergoing modification.
4.Operated by the Royal Navy, but owned by the Army and included in the Army Aviation Helicopter figures.
5.Reduction due to restructuring under medium term strategy plans and moving personnel to Attack Helicopters.
6.The In Service Date for the Defender 4000 was 24 December 2004.
1.Forward Available Fleet is defined as the number of aircraft required to undertake the mandated task; including aircrew and ground crew training, 'in-
work' rectification and operational / tactical trials.
2.The Required Operational Fleet was the Aircraft Establishment plus the Air Engineering Pool (AEP). Sea King HC4 had an AEP of 4, and Sea Harrier 
FA2 an AEP of 2.
FAF1Required Operating Fleet
  
